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Executive summary 
This master thesis in behavioral finance investigates whether it was a sound decision to 
practically ban structured products from the Norwegian markets. The thesis also discusses the 
relationship between culture and investment behavior.  
The prospect theory analysis shows that an irrational investor can increase his utility by 
investing in structured products compared to the alternative investments. Contrarily, a rational 
investor will halve his utility by doing the same. The main conclusion is that investing in 
structured products is irrational, and that it was a sound decision to practically ban structured 
products from the Norwegian market. 
An investigation of the potential link between cultural dimensions and investment choices and 
behavior concludes that a Swiss investor has more than 50 percent greater utility from the 
access to structured products than a Norwegian investor, which strengthens the hypothesis of 
a close relationship between cultural dimensions and investment choices. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Do you wish to profit from the return potential of stock markets without the risk of losing 
your money? Does not the idea of an investment where you cannot lose any money, just win, 
sound compelling? In that case you are certainly not alone! In spring 2006 Norwegians had 
invested close to NOK50bn in products apparently offering such a deal.  
A general term for these products is structured products. By combining two or more securities 
a structured product allows for a variety of risk-return combinations that classical investments 
such as stocks and bonds do not allow for. They are offered by financial institutions, most 
commonly banks, and the typical buyer is a small private investor.  
A search for “structured products” on the Norwegian version of Google immediately returns 
the following newspaper headlines: “Interdiction of structured products” and “Academia 
slaughters the banks”. These headlines give a good indication on the ruling sentiment for 
structured products in Norway. Through articles, papers, and reports media and academia 
have heavily criticized structured products and blamed the banks for being greedy. This has 
placed structured products in an unfavorable light.  
However, there are clearly some bright sides of structured products. Indeed, the products 
could be good investment alternatives for smaller investors. The products allow small private 
investors to invest in commodities and indices that would otherwise be inaccessible. Further, 
the risk-return profiles of the structured products are more complex than investments in 
stocks. Finally, the payoff structure is tailored to fit the investor’s feelings and needs. In this 
way we can say that structured products could be more personal than other investments.  
One reason for the heavy criticism against structured products in Norway could be that the 
vast majority of analyses so far have been limited to classical financial valuations. In this 
paper I will not conduct such an approach. Instead I will apply behavioral finance theory.  
The world of behavioral finance is a world in which human emotions rule, logic has its place, 
but markets are moved as much by psychological factors as by information from corporate 
balance sheets (Montier, 2002). Empirically, behavioral finance both explains the evidence 
that appears anomalous from the efficient markets perspective, and generates new predictions 
that have been confirmed in the data (Shleifer, 2000).  
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The best known theory within the field of behavioral finance is prospect theory. Prospect 
theory is a descriptive framework of choice in the face or risk, and it is a psychologically 
based theory. It emerged as an alternative to the expected utility theory as the inconsistency 
between the theory and real life experiments became clearer.  
I will use prospect theory to analyze structured products. This allows me to combine 
psychological perspectives of the investor’s mindset with financial theory and still have a 
quantitative result. Further, the prospect theory approach allows me to take the investor’s 
perspective. Instead of saying what price the financial institution should have charged for the 
products, I look at what utility the investor achieves from the products. 
As mentioned, structured products in Norway have been heavily criticized. The reputation of 
the products has become horrible during the last five to ten years. Some even claim the banks, 
by selling structured products, have sacrificed their clients on the altar of greed. Eventually, 
regulations tightened, and structured products were practically banned from the Norwegian 
markets in 2008.  
Looking across borders the situation is different, and structured products have a stronger 
reputation. For instance, in Switzerland they are immensely popular. In 2007 more than 
20,000 products were listed on the Swiss stock exchange, and around seven percent of 
invested assets were held in structured products! 
Naturally, the question rises; was it a sound decision to practically ban these products in 
Norway while they are so popular in other countries?  
1.2 Problem set 
Indeed, the main research aim of this master thesis is to answer the question I just asked. 
More precisely, it is to analyze whether the banning of structured products in Norway was a 
sound decision. In order to conclude upon this, I will perform utility calculations of structured 
product investments and the related alternative investments, and compare the utilities from 
each investment. I will also use my findings to investigate how cultural dimensions can 
influence investment choices.  
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1.3  Structure of the paper 
In chapter two I give an introduction to structured products, with emphasis on structured 
products in Norway. I also define the generics of the structured products offered in the 
Norwegian market. 
Next, in chapter three, I briefly present the evolution within the field of decision theory from 
the mean-variance theory via expected utility theory to prospect theory. I elaborate on the 
elements of prospect theory, as well as on the link between cultural dimensions and investors’ 
behavior. 
Chapter four presents my findings on the utility of structured products offered in Norway 
based upon the classical Kahneman and Tversky prospect theory parameters with variations, 
compared to relevant alternative investments. 
In chapter five I use Norwegian and Swiss prospect theory parameters on the product sample 
to see how cultural differences affect the utility of structured products, and thereby investment 
behavior.   
Chapter six summarizes the elements and findings of the thesis. It also suggests topics for 
further research, and I discuss weaknesses of the thesis. 
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2 Structured products 
In this chapter I will elaborate on the characteristics of structured products, and I will present 
the development of the market for structured products in Norway. Towards the end of the 
chapter I will define the generic characteristics of the products offered in Norway. 
2.1 What is a structured product? 
In this part I will go through the basics of structured products. I will define what a structured 
product is. Further I will explain how they are constructed and who the main market players 
are, and why they are attractive. 
2.1.1 Definition 
There is no uniform or consistently embraced definition of structured products. The US 
Structured Products Association, SPA, define structured products as “a security or other 
instrument (e.g., a bank deposit, commercial paper, senior or subordinated debt security or 
note, warrant, etc.), the return on which is based on the performance of one or more reference 
assets, which may include stocks, indices, funds, commodities, exchange rates, etc.” (SPA, 
2008).  
Another definition explains the product as a “combination of classical assets such as stocks, 
bonds, and indices with at least one derivative, into a bundle that shall have specific 
interesting features for investors, like capital protection or increased participation” (Hens & 
Rieger, 2009).  
A third explanation of structured products is given by the Financial Supervisory Authority of 
Norway, or Finanstilsynet. This institution will hereby be referred to as the FSA. They 
describe structured products as investment products that consist of a deposit or a zero coupon 
bond, and a derivative where the deposit is the safe element of the structured products 
assuring the investor to get back at least his initial investment at maturity whereas the 
derivative is supposed to generate return above the guaranteed payoff (Kredittilsynet, 2008).  
It is interesting to notice that when the FSA describes structured products, they define them as 
capital protection products.  
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2.1.2 The market players 
According to FSA there are three players in the market for structured products (Finanstilsynet, 
(2), 2008). These are the buyer, the manufacturer, and the distributor. Figure 1 explains the 
role of these players in the market. 
 
Figure 1 - The different players in the market for structured products 
From the illustration we notice the double role of the distributor. This can create conflicts. On 
the one hand the distributor is serving the needs of the buyer and giving investment advices. 
On the other hand the distributor serves as a sales person of the manufacturer.  
In the rest of the paper, when referring to the distributor of structured products, I will use the 
terms bank and financial institution reciprocally although they in reality are different players 
and have different roles. For instance, Acta Kapitalforvaltning is not a bank, but a company 
providing investment services. However, when it comes to structured products they share the 
same role in Norway; they distribute them. Therefore this reciprocal use of terms is 
acceptable.  
2.1.3 Risk-return positioning of structured products 
In terms of risk and return structured products are situated somewhere in between an 
investment in stocks and a risk-free investment, also referred to as a bank deposit. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
Buyer
• Represents the demand 
side in the market
• An investor who wants a 
product that fits his 
specific needs or 
investment preferences. 
• Typically a small private 
investor without great 
knowledge of the 
financial markets.
Distributor
• Often referred to as the 
buyer's "advisor". 
However, the distributor 
is the agent of both the 
buyer and the 
manufacturer.
• Often the client's retail 
bank, such as DnB NOR 
or Nordea, but also other 
financial institutions 
such as Acta 
Kapitalforvaltning.
Manufacturer
• Represents the supply 
side of the market.
• The one that actually 
makes the products.
• Usually a bigger 
investment bank such as 
Morgan Stanly or 
Goldman Sachs.
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Figure 2 - Risk-return ranking of different asset classes 
This figure is meant to illustrate the risk-return ranking of different asset classes to provide a 
clearer understanding of the properties of structured products. It is an illustrative sketch, and 
should not be understood as a precise prediction of the risk and return of different asset 
classes. 
Assuming the bank runs no default risk, or at least that the deposits in the bank are guaranteed 
by a third party, bank deposit is typically regarded as a risk-free investment. Since there is no 
risk, the return is low. In the other end of the scale we find the stock market. Here the investor 
faces downside risks as well as upside risks. This means that in the same way the investor 
risks to lose his money, he also risks to make a profit on his money. The expected return from 
the stock market is superior to what the investor could expect from a bank deposit. In between 
the stock market and a bank deposit we find the typical structured product. The risk is lower 
than for an investment in the stock market, but so is the return. However, the return is higher 
than what a bank deposit yields, but so is the risk.  
2.1.4 Different types of structured products 
There are many types of structured products. They may differ from bank to bank and country 
to country. Still there are some similarities in the global markets. Comparing the German, 
Swiss and US market for structured products, we can find that three of the same product types 
are in the top list of the three countries. These are discount certificates, bonus certificates and 
reverse convertibles (Hens & Rieger, 2009).   
When it comes to the Norwegian market, there were two main categories of structured 
products offered; AIOs and BMAs. AIO is the abbreviation for “Aksjeindeksobligasjoner” or 
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protected equity note, whereas BMA is the abbreviation for “Banksparing med 
aksjeavkastning” or market-linked certificate of deposit (Quinn, 2009). The dominating 
structure of these products has been capital protection products, constructed on a call-option 
(Klype, 2006).  
2.1.5 The construction of a typical structured product in Norway 
A typical structured product offered in the Norwegian market consists of three elements; a 
certificate of deposit or a zero coupon bond to create the capital protection, an investment in a 
derivative to generate a return, and fees.  
Figure 3 illustrates how a capital protection product constructed on a call-option is 
constructed, and includes a numerical example as well.  
 
Figure 3 – The composition of a capital protection product 
In this capital protection product the investor is guaranteed to get his invested amount (100) 
back at maturity. However, what he pays is slightly higher (104) due to transaction fees (4) 
charged by the bank. To secure the invested amount the bank invests a sum equaling the 
present value of a five year bank deposit in a certificate of deposit (80). How big this risk-free 
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investment is depends on the risk-free rate of return. Normally the risk-free investment is 
somewhere from 80 to 90 percent (Bøe, 2007).  
The remaining amount is invested in some kind of derivative (20). The underlying of the 
derivative is one or more indices related to stock markets, exchange rate markets, 
commodities market, interest rate market and so forth. The return on the structured products is 
therefore somewhat related to one of these indices. 
The amount invested in the derivative, in our case an option, is not the real investment, 
because the bank charges a service fee. This fee partly goes to the bank, and partly to the 
manufacturer of the product (Johnsen, 2008).  
The investment in the option (15) serves as the return generator of the product. Even though 
this investment fails, meaning that the option at maturity has a value of zero, the bank still has 
the deposit which at maturity is equal to the invested amount (100). This is what will be paid 
back to the investor. Therefore the investor cannot lose his invested amount, and his capital is 
protected.  
However, the investor does not break even on the investment by having the invested amount 
back at maturity. To break even he must realize a return of the product that is equal to the 
return of the alternative investment which is 104 times the risk-free rate. I use the risk-free 
rate because I assume that the real alternative of the investor is to put his money on the 
savings account.   
If the product is debt financed, which has been frequent in Norway, the expected return that is 
necessary for the investor to break even must naturally be higher since there is an interest 
margin related to the debt financing, as well as some extra fees.  
2.1.6 The attractiveness of structured products 
In the Norwegian market the typical investors in structured products are smaller private 
investors who are looking for a higher return than what a risk-free deposit generates (Bøe 
2007). Why are these private investors attracted by structured products? And why do financial 
institutions sell them? One reason is the different risk-return profile the product offers 
compared to a direct investment in the underlying (Klype, 2006). However, one may ask why 
the investor could not hold the same positions as the structured product by investing directly 
in the derivatives market himself. This would be more profitable for the investor since he 
would not have to pay the fees to the financial institution and thereby increase his actual 
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return. In case of a professional investor with a considerable capital base it is hard to find the 
reasons why not. However, in the case of a small private investor there are at least three main 
reasons (Hens & Rieger, 2009). Firstly the private investor has inferior knowledge compared 
to the bank. Secondly he has inferior access to the derivatives market and markets in general. 
For instance, a small private investor would normally not have access to indices linked to the 
Japanese real estate or indices linked to the spread between two indices. Thirdly, complex SPs 
require dynamic hedging methods that are out of reach for the private investor.  
In other words it is a question of competency, market access and technology. And there is also 
a question of size. By selling the same product to thousands of customers the bank can 
achieve economies of scale and push margins down. 
From the bank’s point of view structured products are profitable for at least two reasons. 
Firstly the bank can charge fees to the investors, as we have seen. Secondly the investments 
provide the bank with relatively cheap funding through deposits or bond issues. If the investor 
leverages his position through the same bank it can charge an interest rate margin as well. In 
both cases the bank has no risk exposure.  
2.2 Structured products in Norway 
In this part I will elaborate on the development of the market for structured products in 
Norway. Firstly I will look at the history. Thereafter I will go through the regulations of 
structured products and see how they have developed. I will also present the main critical 
arguments towards structured products in Norway. In the last part I will define the generic 
characteristics of structured products offered in the Norwegian market.  
2.2.1 History 
In 1992 structured products were introduced to professional investors in Norway (Bøe, 2007). 
In the mid 90s the products were offered to private investors. The market for structured 
products developed rapidly during the following decade (Klype, 2006). It peaked in summer 
2006 with NOK48.8bn invested (SSB, 2010). More than 90 percent of this amount was held 
by private investors (Almklov, Tørum, & Skjæveland, 2006). At this time the majority of 
banks marketed structured products (Klype, 2006). The magazine Dine Penger claims that 
structured products have been sold to as many as 150,000 clients in Norway (Ormseth, 2009). 
By the end of 2009 there was about NOK19.9bn invested in structured products in Norway 
(SSB, 2010). 
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Figure 4 shows the development of total amount invested in structured products in Norway 
from 2003-2009 based on figures from SSB (SSB, 2010).  
 
Figure 4 – Invested amount in structured products from 2003-2009, and the distribution between AIO and BMA 
We see that the investments peaked in March 2006 with NOK48.4bn. AIOs dominate until the 
end of 2005. From 2006 BMAs take over as the most popular category of structured products 
and by November 2009 85.2 percent is invested in BMAs. In general we see that the 
investments have declined steadily since the peak. This declining trend could be explained by 
bad publicity in the media, and new regulations (Kredittilsynet, 2008). As a matter of fact, 
since 2008 structured products were practically banned from the market as a consequence of 
new regulations.  
The financial institutions can allow for debt financing of the structured products, and they can 
provide the credit themselves. This was especially the case for Norway (Quinn, 2009). Indeed, 
the debt financing of the products soared over the period. By year end 2006, NOK34bn of the 
total investments of NOK45.8bn in structured products in Norway were financed by debt. To 
put in more clearly, about three out of four kroner invested in structured products were 
financed by debt (SSB, 2010). The debt financing peaked in October 2007 with 83.3 percent 
of the amount invested financed by debt (SSB, 2010). The Norwegian Ministry of Finance 
practically banned debt financing of structured products in 2008 (Forbrukerrådet, 2009).  
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2.2.2 Criticism and regulations 
Criticism and regulations are closely linked. When the critical voices become loud enough, 
regulators have to react. In this part I will give a chronological presentation of the 
development of regulations of structured products in Norway. I will also present the main 
arguments against the products. 
2.2.2.1 Regulations 
Throughout the 2000s there has been a development from very soft regulations towards firm 
regulations and indeed to what is called a complete stop to the purchase of structured products 
in Norway (Finanstilsynet, 2008). 
The first circular from the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway concerning structured 
products is dated 16 February 2004. It gives guidelines about the disclosure of information 
required from providers of structured products in Norway (Finanstilsynet, 2004). Its purpose 
is to make sure the clients could assess, compare and choose among different structured 
products. In order to do so the clients need to be properly informed about the price, fees and 
margins charged by the provider (Finanstilsynet, 2004). 
A second circular is dated 25 September 2006. This circular replaces the circular from 2004, 
and gives further and more detailed guidelines about the requirements to the information 
disclosed in relation to the structured products, and also to the advisory process related to the 
sale of structured products (Finanstilsynet, 2006). 
MiFID (Markets for financial instruments directive), applying to all banks and financial 
institutions in Europe and their clients, is introduced in Norway in 2007 with effect from 1 
November 2007 (Nordea, 2007). It is a codification of existing law and implies stronger 
consumer protection (Forbrukerrådet, 2009). In relation to compliance to this directive is the 
introduction of a new law regarding securities trading, introduced 29 June 2007. A circular of 
10 July 2007 related to the new law explains that banks and financial institutions from now on 
need to obtain a concession if financial advisory services related to specific financial 
instruments are to be offered to its customers (Finanstilsynet, 2007). In my understanding 
financial institutions now needed concession to sell equity-indexed bonds (AIOs). However, 
sale of index-linked bank deposits (BMAs) did not need concession since BMAs were not 
considered a financial instrument.  
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This situation lasted until the changes in Regulation of 25 September 2006 nr. 1317 on the 
duty of disclosure in relation to structured products offered for purchase took effect on 1 
March 2008. From now on many of the regulations related to investor protection were to 
apply to the sale of BMAs. As a consequence of these changes, the regulations for the sale of 
BMAs become identical to the regulations for the sale of AIOs (Finanstilsynet, 2008), 
meaning increased investor protection.  
In relation to the changed regulation mentioned above, the FSA wrote a circular (4/2008) that 
to a large extent put an end to structured products in Norway. In the circular the FSA 
presupposed that institutions should not sell structured products to customers who could not 
be regarded as professional investors. Moreover, the FSA advised institutions against offering 
debt financing when selling structured products (Finanstilsynet, 2008). The FSA emphasized 
that the financial institutions have a duty to do an assessment of the client, and have a duty to 
inform about all costs related to the investment.  
The purpose of the assessment was to make the financial institution capable of assessing 
which specific financial instruments or investment services are in line with the investment 
goals of the client (Kleven, 2008). It must reveal the client’s financial situation, investment 
goal and knowledge (Forbrukerrådet, 2009). The financial advisors have to document that 
such a test of the client has been done. The information obtained in the test is to be used to 
assess which investment solutions serve the client the best, and thereby should be 
recommended. The financial institution must make sure that the products offered are 
compatible with the client’s investment goal, that the client is financially capable of bearing 
the risks and that the client has sufficient and necessary knowledge and experience to 
understand the risks (Kleven, 2008).  
Moreover, the circular states that expensive investment products cannot be recommended if 
the client’s investment goal can be reached by investing in a cheaper product (Kleven, 2008).  
In a press release related to the circular, the Director General (at that time) Bjørn Skogstad 
Aamo at the FSA stated (Finanstilsynet, 2008):  
”The new regulations mean in practice a complete stop to the purchase of structured products 
financed by loans. Further, the regulations mean that banks and other financial institutions 
will normally not be selling such products to normal savers, who cannot be regarded as 
professionals in this context.”  
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After the introduction of the new regulations, the invested amount has surged dramatically 
(Finanstilsynet, (2), 2008). Indeed, it has practically stopped (Finanstilsynet, 2009).  
2.2.2.2 Criticism 
Structured products existed for many years before critical voices started to be heard
1
. As we 
have seen, the products are now practically forbidden in Norway. According to professor 
Bjerksund at NHH the estimated aggregated losses of the investors are about NOK10bn 
(Ormseth, 2009).  
According to Bøe (2007) there are three major areas of criticism; debt-financing, misleading 
prospects, and a complicated structure of the products hiding high fees (Bøe, 2007). From my 
observations of media, academia and authorities, including Bøe’s work, I have deducted the 
following three areas of criticism; debt financing, the complexity of the products, and the 
advisory and marketing process. 
2.2.2.2.1 Debt financing 
Let us start with the debt financing of structured products. According to the Norwegian 
Consumer Council, Forbrukerrådet, debt financing of structured products is a Norwegian 
phenomenon (Forbrukerrådet, 2009). The debt financing of structured products made it 
possible even for clients without any savings or in a mediocre financial situation to make big 
investments in the products. This was because the default risk of a debt financed structured 
product was limited to interest payments since the majority of the invested amount was placed 
in risk-free assets (Quinn, 2009).  
One cannot reject the hypothesis that it was the easy access to debt financing that ultimately 
banned the products in Norway. The debt financing was to a large extent motivated by the 
banks’ hunts for profits. About ¾ of the investments in structured products have been 
financed by debt. In a study by NHH professor Thore Johnsen, he concludes that investment 
in 100 percent debt financed structured products had lower return than the risk free rate. The 
products he investigated had a yearly loss of 2.2-2.3% compared to a risk-free return 
(Johnsen, 2008).  
Professor Bjerksund is harsh in his critics (Tørring & Hansen, 2008). He says that the debt 
financing is just a cunning way to wrap in an extra cost. He claims the banks would never 
                                                 
1
 The exception is Geir Ormseth in the magazine Dine Penger, who for a long time fought alone to put focus on 
the very limited return potential of structured products. 
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have succeeded in selling this product to professional investors and that they would have 
laughed of the products. 
2.2.2.2.2 Product complexity  
A second area of criticism is related to the complexity of the products. The complexity of the 
products made it very hard for non-professional clients to understand the costs, margins and 
fees of the products, as well as the risks and return possibilities (Finanstilsynet, (2), 2008). 
According to Bjerksund no ordinary bank client could fully understand the products without 
financial expertise (Tørring & Hansen, 2008).  
Moreover, construction and distribution of structured products may have been highly 
motivated by the fact that the income of the middle men was hidden to the investors (Kleven, 
2008). Yield calculations of 350 structured products with maturity before third quarter 2007 
and issue date from 1997 illustrate that most of the equity financed and debt financed 
structured products do not generate additional yields compared to an investment without risk 
(Aamo, 2008). In a study by NHH professor Thore Johnsen, he concludes that the banks 
charged 25 percent of the invested amount in costs and hidden fees in case of a 100 percent 
debt financed product. For equity financed products the number is 20 percent (Johnsen, 
2008)
2
.  
The FSA concludes that it is reason to believe that increased focus on the return possibilities 
of structured products has contributed to the decrease in sale of structured products 
(Finanstilsynet, (3) 2008). From this it is natural to conclude that as soon as the clients 
understood the actual fees charged on the structured product investments, they did not find 
them very attractive anymore.  
2.2.2.2.3 Advisory service and marketing process 
A third area of criticism is the advisory process and the marketing of the products. In the 
advisory process there is reason to believe that sales personal, advisors, and marketers did not 
have good enough understanding of the products (Finanstilsynet, (2), 2008). Another report 
by FSA concludes that the banks did not separate between advisory services and sales 
(Finanstilsynet, (3) 2008). 
                                                 
2
 Even though this report was written on two specific products from one specific bank, the findings can be 
generalized to apply on the vast majority of all debt financed structured products in the market. Indeed, in a 
comment to Dine Penger Professor Koekebakker says that the two specific products are among the better 
products in the market, and that the majority of products are worse (Ormseth, Bankklagenemda latterliggjør DnB 
Nor, 2009).  
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Further, the sale force, distributors and advisors are accused of disguising the risks related to 
the products by labeling the product from a random characteristic and not its specific and 
most important characteristics (Kleven, 2008). The common inaccuracy in the description of 
the products could serve to disguise the specific risks related to each instrument.  
In the marketing of the products misleading words like “guaranteed” and “stock market 
return” have been used and sold with false promises of “stock market return without risk” and 
“bank deposits with stock market return” (Omseth, 2008). In the previous mentioned study by 
professor Johnsen he claims the banks’ marketing has been irresponsible (Johnsen, 2008).  
The marketing has been aggressive and the banks have manipulated their clients to invest in 
structured products (Omseth, 2008). According to professor Johnsen, the biggest bank in 
Norway, DnB Nor, have been telling untruths to its customers that would have failed any 
student in a basic finance class (Ormseth, 2009). Johnsen further claims that DnB Nor 
Markets apparently has limited knowledge of fundamental issues in investment management.  
We see that the advisory process and the marketing of the structured products have been 
accused of being unprofessional and little serious.  
The reputation of the banks has definitely suffered from the blast over structured products. 20 
January 2009 the Complaints Boards of the Norwegian banking industry, Bankklagenemda, 
ruled that a client had been tricked by his bank to invest in structured product. They advised 
the bank to refund the investment (Omseth, 2008). This case is currently ongoing in the legal 
system.  Dine Penger called the day of this announcement “perhaps the blackest day in the 
history of Norwegian banking…this is namely a scam without parallel in the history of 
Norwegian banking” (Staavi, 2009). Geir Ormseth in Dine Penger was even harsher in his 
judgment. He claimed “the banks have sacrificed their credibility on the altar of greed” 
(Ormseth, 2009). 
2.2.3 Product trends in the Norwegian market 
In this section I will present the product trends typical for the Norwegian market. I will also 
look at the generic properties of the products offered in the Norwegian market. 
As I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, it is interesting to notice that the FSA 
describes structured products as capital protection products (Finanstilsynet, (2), 2008). 
Moreover, according to Klype (2006) the dominating structured products are capital 
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protection products. I therefore conclude that capital protection products have been the most 
typical product in Norway.  
There is only one register for structured products, and this is in the data base of Norsk 
Tillittsmann, Trustee. The database only provides information on AIO volumes, since AIOs 
are bond-backed securities. However, there are no statistics available for BMAs.  
The difference between an AIO and a BMA is according to DnB NOR very small. In terms of 
the underlying structure, there is in principle no difference. The difference lies in the liquidity 
of the paper, in the recognition on the bank’s balance sheets, and the risk related to complete 
capital insurance. Since the products are generally the same, I conclude that the statistics from 
Trustee could be applied on the market as a whole. 
According to data from Stamdata, the database of Trustee, among the ten biggest issues ever 
done, DNB Nor has six of them, including the two biggest, which are both six billion NOK 
each. In comparison, the third place is an issue of two billion NOK. The other banks among in 
the top ten are Nordea Bank Norge ASA, Sparebanken Hedmark, and Nordea Bank Finland 
Abp.  
The product that has sold the most is DnB Global 00/06, is one of two products involved in 
what has become known as the Røeggen case. The Røeggen case is a legal law suit in which 
the small private investor Røeggen sues DnB Nor for advising him to invest in DnB Global 
00/06 and DnB Sektor 00/06.  
Returning to the generic product, based on interviews and other reports, it has the following 
properties: 
 Lifetime is typically three to five years. Products issued in the beginning of 2000s had 
longer lifetime than products issued later in the decade 
 The average volume is NOK120m, whereas the median volume is NOK60m 
 The underlying is shares indices, typically three to four international indices 
 Structure is Asiatic quanto option, often with Asiatic tale and no exchange rate 
exposure. The majority of the products are capital protection products  
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3 Decision theory 
The domain of decision theory is more than 200 years old. It is about choice under 
uncertainty, and concerns how people ideally should make decisions, and how they actually 
do it. In this chapter I will present the mean-variance theorem, the expected utility framework 
and finally the prospect theory. I will present all the three theories because we need a general 
understanding of the evolution of decision theory to understand the rise of prospect theory. 
However, the majority of this chapter will be dedicated to prospect theory.  
The text is to an extent and unless otherwise is explicitly stated, based upon chapter two in 
“Behavioral finance for private banking” by Hens and Bachmann (Bachmann & Hens, 2008). 
3.1 Introduction to decision theory 
We have at least two different approaches to decision theory; the prescriptive approach and 
the descriptive approach. The difference lies within the views of human behavior. The 
prescriptive approach focuses on how people should make decisions. It assumes an ideal 
decision-maker who is fully informed, able to compute with perfect accuracy and full 
rationality. Contrarily, the descriptive approach tries to describe how people actually make 
decisions. It includes the psychological aspects of people and assumes that people behave 
irrationally. The latter approach is becoming increasingly popular (Montier, 2002). 
Daniel Bernoulli first defined the concept of expected utility. Almost two hundred years later 
the theory was made acceptable on the basis of some generally acceptable axioms by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern. However, during the 20
th
 century it became clear that humans do 
not behave rationally, especially through the work of Allais and Ellsberg. Kahneman and 
Tversky founded a mathematical base to the behavioral approach with their prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1992).  
3.2 Mean-variance analysis 
The mean-variance theory focuses on how we should make choices. It is in other words a 
prescriptive approach. Fundamentally investors face a very basic choice; should they put their 
money in a savings account, or should they invest in other asset classes? The determining 
factors are risk and return. Whereas there is no risk related to the bank deposit, assuming no 
bankruptcy costs, there could be a substantial amount of risk related to investments in other 
asset classes. However, the return of the bank deposit is usually lower than for the other asset 
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classes. For instance, historically for long periods it can be found that stocks have a higher 
return than riskless investments.  
In his ground-breaking portfolio theory from 1952, Markowitz proofs the link between risk 
and return and recommends the investment rule of expected return versus variance of return 
(Markowitz, 1952). Since higher return is linked to higher risk, the highest return may not be 
the preferable choice for all investors.  
Based on the investors’ risk preferences, the mean-variance framework uses the utility 
function presented in Figure 5 to calculate each investor’s position on the efficient frontier: 
 
Figure 5 - Mean-variance utility function 
We see that the utility for the investor is determined by two factors; the risk-return 
opportunities in the market,   and   , and the investor’s risk aversion   . The risk-return 
opportunities in the market determine a set of efficient portfolios, i.e. the portfolios of risky 
assets with minimum risk for any given expected return level. This set of portfolios forms the 
efficient frontier. The risk preference of each investor determines his location on the frontier.  
The market opportunities are available and similar for all investors. What differentiates the 
investors is therefore the risk aversion. Each investor can have different attitudes towards risk. 
Some are risk seeking whereas some are risk averse. Thus, the risk aversion parameter may 
vary, and by consequence the investors may have different utilities.  
James Tobin introduced in 1958 the two-fund-separation theorem which reduces the efficient 
frontier to one optimal point within a market. By consequence, the only element 
differentiating the investors is the amount invested in the optimal portfolio compared to the 
amount invested in risk-free assets (Tobin, 1958).  
Today it is well-known that investors do not follow the two-fund-separation theorem. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice that the mean-variance theory still holds a very strong 
position in portfolio choice (Campbell & Viceira, 2002).  
We have so far looked at the basic principles of portfolio choices. Let us further continue with 
a model that can determine how we make rational decisions when there is a risk.  
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3.3 Expected utility theory 
The expected utility theory is widely accepted as a normative model of rational choice and 
moreover as a descriptive model of economic behavior (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). It 
provides a valuable guide for action and helps people think systematically about risky 
alternatives. 
A common approach to expected utility theory is the lottery approach. This approach will be 
used when it is convenient throughout this paper. 
3.3.1 The fundamental tenets of expected theory 
Kahneman and Tversky state that the application of expected utility theory to choices between 
prospects is based on three tenets, namely expectation, asset integration, and risk aversion 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Expectation: The overall utility of a prospect is the expected utility of its outcomes.  
Asset integration: A prospect is acceptable if the utility resulting from integrating the 
prospect with one’s assets exceeds the utility of those assets alone. This means that the 
domain of expected utility is defined by final states, and not over gains or losses.  
Risk aversion: A person is risk averse if he prefers the certain prospect x to any risky 
prospect with expected value x. In expected utility theory, risk aversion is equivalent to the 
concavity of the utility function. The practice of risk aversion is among the best known 
generalizations concerning risky choices. It led to the idea that utility is a concave function of 
money. This idea has been applied since the eighteenth century.    
3.3.2 Axioms of rationality 
Before we have a closer look into the representation of the expected utility, it is time to look 
at the concept of rationality. There are at least four axioms that everyone agrees to and that 
everyone should follow and hence tries to follow if they want to make rational decisions. 
These axioms are called the axioms of rationality. We need them to define the concept of 
preference, which in turn is needed to define a choice or a behavior as rational. The four 
axioms of rationality are assumptions on completeness, continuousness, transitivity, and 
independence. 
Completeness is about defining a preference of A over B, B over A, or that we are indifferent 
towards them. Transitivity is related to the consistency of the preferences, meaning that if 
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you prefer A over B, and B over C, then you prefer A over C as well. If not, you will 
systematically lose money. Continuousness of the preferences is a prerequisite when 
applying the utility function. We need this property to create a link between the decision-
maker’s preferences and the numerical values. With continuous preferences minor changes in 
the data will not lead to sudden jumps in the portfolio. Finally, the independence axiom says 
that you can mix two lotteries with the same third one without changing the preference order. 
In addition to the four axioms, we introduce the axiom of state dominance, also called the 
“Axiom 0”. This axiom is more basic than the four others. This axiom defines that if lottery A 
in each state pays off the same as lottery B, the investor should consider the two lotteries as 
equal. If additionally lottery A in at least one state pays off more than lottery B, lottery A 
should be considered as superior. If axiom 0 is violated, the investor acts irrationally.  
3.3.3 Representation 
We can state that the preferences defined over pairs of alternative outcomes can be 
represented by a utility function if and only if the preference relation is continuous, complete 
and transitive. More precisely, the expected utility is founded on the representation theorem 
that goes back to von Neumann and Morgenstern. Let ≥ be a preference order that is 
complete, transitive and continuous, then ≥ can be represented by an expected utility function 
if and only if ≥ satisfies the independence axiom (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). 
The first three axioms are needed to assign numerical values to the outcomes of lotteries to 
compare them. If the fourth axiom is satisfied, the preference order can be represented by an 
expected utility function. This representation states that if a decision-maker prefers lottery A 
to lottery B, then lottery A yields a greater expected utility to the decision-maker than lottery 
B, and vice versa. Mathematically this link is presented in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 - Analytical representation of the preference order 
A key advantage of the expected utility representation is that it separates beliefs from risk 
attitudes. This makes it a valuable guide for decision-making. 
A very basic definition of expected utility can be found in textbooks on microeconomics. For 
instance Pindyck and Rubinfeld define it as “the sum of the utilities associated with all 
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possible outcomes, weighted by the probability that each outcome will occur” (Pindyck & 
Rubinfeld, 2009). Mathematically this can be expressed according to Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 - Analytical representation of the expected utility theory 
   represents each consequence that may occur, whereas    represents the probability that 
consequence i occur.  
3.3.4 Certainty equivalent, risk premium, and risk preference 
Related to the expected utility function there are some terms that should be defined. Firstly, 
the certainty equivalent payoff is a payoff that is regarded as good as playing the lottery. The 
certainty equivalent rate is the rate that risk-free investments must return to provide the same 
utility score as the risky lottery. In other words, it is the rate that, if earned with certainty, 
would provide a utility score equivalent to that of the lottery in question. The certainty 
equivalent rate of return is a natural way to compare the utility values of competing portfolios 
(Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2008). The utility of the certainty equivalent equals the expected 
utility from playing the lottery.  
Secondly, risk premium is defined as the difference between the expected value of the lottery 
and the certainty equivalent. Thirdly, the concept of risk preference should be elaborated. A 
risk-averse decision-maker requires a positive risk premium to play the lottery, and his 
certainty equivalent is lower than the expected value of the lottery. On the other hand, a risk 
seeking decision-maker is willing to pay a positive risk premium to play, thus the certainty 
equivalent is higher than the expected value of the lottery. The risk preference of the decision-
maker can be understood from the slope of the utility function. If the slope is convex, the 
decision-maker is risk-seeking. Contrarily, a concave slope represents a risk-averse decision-
maker. If the slope is linear, the decision-maker is risk-neutral.  
Figure 8 represents these terms graphically. 
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Figure 8 - Representation of risk aversion, risk premium, and certainty equivalent (Bachmann & Hens, 
2008) 
3.3.5 Violations of expected utility theory 
In this section I will present some of the critics that rose against expected utility theory. This 
will give us an understanding of why a new theory was born. The present section is primarily 
based on the violations observed in experiments by Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). 
The axioms of rationality presented earlier in this chapter are issue of major criticism. The 
core of the criticism is that the axioms do not describe the real behavior of decision-makers. 
Economist Maurice Allais was the first to recognize that expected utility theory is not 
descriptive of how people generally make choices. This is known as the Allais paradox 
(Allais, 1953),(Shefrin, 2005). Daniel Ellsberg casted doubts on the basic premise of 
subjective expected utility theory that subjective probabilities are equivalent to objective 
probabilities (Ellsberg, 1961). 
Through empirical work, Kahneman and Tversky found numerous violations of the tenets of 
expected utility theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). They organized the violations into four 
effects; the certainty effect, reflection effect, probabilistic insurance, and the isolation effect. 
3.3.5.1 Certainty effect 
The certainty effect says that people overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative 
to outcomes that are merely probable. Hence, the certainty effect is a violation of the 
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substitution axiom which states that if B is preferred to A, then any probabilistic mixture (B, 
p) must be preferred to the mixture (A, p).  
In a survey people were asked to choose between having 3000 with 100 percent certainty, or 
4000 with 80 percent certainty. Then they were asked to choose between 3000 with 25 
percent certainty and 4000 with 20 percent certainty. In the first choice 80 percent of the 
respondents chose 3000 for certain. However, in the second problem 65 percent of the 
respondents chose 4000 with 20 percent probability. The example shows that reducing the 
probability of winning from 100 percent to 25 percent has a greater effect on people’s 
behavior than a reduction from 80 percent to 20 percent.  
3.3.5.2 Reflection effect 
The reflection effect describes what happens when the signs of the outcomes of a prospect are 
reversed, so that gains are replaced by losses. Indeed, the reflection of prospects around zero 
reverses the preference order. By this one can conclude that people are risk seeking in losses, 
and risk aversion in gains, contrarily to what expected utility would have predicted. This 
effect was indeed early noticed by Markowitz (Markowitz, 1952). Additionally, the reflection 
effect eliminates aversion for uncertainty or variability as an explanation of the previously 
mentioned certainty effect.  
Among the previous mentioned respondents (3000,1) was preferred to (4000, .80). However, 
swapping the signs reveals the opposite preferences, meaning that (-4000, .80) is preferred to -
3000 with certainty. Similarly (-3000, .25) is preferred to (-4000, .20). 
3.3.5.3 Probabilistic insurance 
The prevalence of the purchase of insurance against both small and large losses has been 
regarded by many as strong evidence for the concavity of the utility function for money. 
However, a closer look at the insurance programs that people prefer does not support the 
notion that the utility function for money is concave everywhere. One example is probabilistic 
insurance.  
Probabilistic insurance is an example of an insurance problem where people’s responses are 
inconsistent with the concavity hypothesis. It represents many forms of protective action 
where one pays a certain cost to reduce the probability of an undesirable event without 
eliminating it altogether. Empirical results indicate that probabilistic insurance is generally 
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unattractive. Contrarily, expected utility theory, with a concave utility function, states that that 
probabilistic insurance is superior to regular insurance. 
3.3.5.4 Isolation effect 
In order to simplify the choice between alternatives, people often disregard components that 
are common, and focus on the components that differentiate them. This approach to choice 
problems may produce inconsistent preferences, because a pair of prospects can be 
decomposed in many ways, and this sometimes leads to different preferences. In other words, 
two prospects that are equivalent in probabilities and outcome could have different values 
depending on their formulation. This phenomenon is referred to as the isolation effect.  
We can conclude that expected utility theory is inappropriate to describe actual behavior. Let 
us now turn to the new model that arose on the failures of the expected utility theory. 
3.4 Prospect theory 
So far we have looked at what could be called the traditional approach to risk. In the case of 
mean-variance analysis, we saw that the volatility was the unique risk factor driving decision-
making under uncertainty. In the case of expected utility theory we saw that the variance was 
used as a risk measure, and we assumed that investors weight negative returns equally to 
positive returns. When we now turn to prospect theory, this is no longer the case.  
3.4.1 Background 
As we have seen earlier, the grandfathers of the expected utility framework, von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1944), show that if preferences satisfy a number of plausible axioms - 
completeness, transitivity, continuity, and independence – then they are rational and can be 
represented by the expectation of a utility function (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). 
However, in the last quarter of the 20
th
 century researchers and economists started questioning 
the expected utility theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1992). More and more evidence showed 
that decision makers systematically violated the basic tenets of expected utility theory, and 
behavioral finance saw its formal beginnings in the 1980s (Thaler, 2005).  
In the beginning of the 90s a common agreement took shape stating that the expected utility 
theory did not provide an adequate description of individual choice (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1992). A variety of alternative models have been proposed, such as Camerer, Fishburn and 
Libby, and Machina. Machina proposes a general framework for describing generalized 
theories of choice under uncertainty (Machina, 1987). Camerer evaluated a series of 
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alternative theories of choice under uncertainty (Camerer, 1989). His general finding was that 
no single theory can account for the average choice patterns that people typically generate 
(Shefrin, 2005). Fishburn and Libby evaluated alternative descriptive models of individual 
risk-taking behavior in business decisions based upon a review of experimental studies 
(Fishburn & Libby, 1977).  
However, prospect theory is by far the most well-known descriptive decision theory 
(Bachmann & Hens, 2008). It has gained much ground the last decade (Montier, 2002). In 
2002 the authors were awarded the Nobel laureate. This reflects the importance of the theory. 
According to Thaler the prospect theory is the most promising theory for financial application 
and it is the most successful at capturing the experimental results (Thaler, 2005).  
Prospect theory brings psychology into the heart of economic analysis. Limited possibilities 
of quantification are often a challenge when combining economic analysis and psychology. 
However, prospect theory has a solid mathematical fundament which makes it comfortable for 
economists to play with (Montier, 2002).   
The grandfathers of prospect theory are the two psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky. In a paper from 1979 they presented an alternative decision theory that did take the 
violations of classical decision theory into account. Further, in 1992 they published an article 
with several improvements to their original theory, as well as extensions. As mentioned 
earlier, in 2002 they were awarded the Nobel laureate for their ground-breaking work.  
The main difference between expected utility theory and prospect theory is that whereas 
expected utility theory is about how the world should be, prospect theory focuses on how the 
world actually is. In other words, it is a descriptive theory instead of a prescriptive approach 
(Montier, 2002). Prospect theory has its main strength in its descriptive validity. However, it 
is relatively complicated in deriving applications (Bachmann & Hens, 2008). 
3.4.2 Theory 
Prospect theory is defined as “a general psychological approach that describes the way 
people make choices among risky alternatives” (Shefrin, 2007). It is best described by two 
phases. The first phase is the framing and the processing of a decision problem. The second 
phase is the evaluation (Bachmann & Hens, 2008).  
The framing phase concerns psychological biases, heuristics, and how investors and 
individuals handle information.  Due to limited capacity in the processing of a decision 
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problem, we tend to use heuristics or rules of thumbs as proxies to increase the speed of the 
processing (Montier, 2007). A bias is a predisposition toward error. A heuristic is a rule of 
thumb used to make a decision. I will not go deeper into the framing phase in this paper. For 
interested readers I recommend Shefrin (2007) and Montier (2002, 2007). 
The evaluation phase consists of two elements. Firstly, it consists of a utility function defined 
over changes in wealth rather than over final wealth. This is known as the value function. 
Secondly, the evaluation phase consists of a probability weighting function allowing for 
objective probabilities to be replaced by subjective decision weights (Bachmann & Hens, 
2008). The evaluation phase is expressed mathematically in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9 - Analytical representation of prospect theory 
Parameter       is a non-linear weighting function, while         is the value function 
evaluated with respect to a reference point   which is determined by the subjective feelings of 
the individual.  
These two elements in prospect theory are fundamentally different from what we find in the 
expected utility theory in at least two ways. Firstly, the risk approach in general is 
fundamentally different from the one in traditional finance. Traditional finance uses variance 
as the risk measure and suggests that individuals weigh negative returns equally to positive 
returns. Indeed, in the case of mean-variance theory volatility is the unique risk factor driving 
decisions under uncertainty. In contrast, prospect theory proposes that individual risk 
preferences depend significantly on gains and losses with respect to a certain reference point, 
meaning that risk preferences could not be derived solely from the mean (Bachmann & Hens, 
2008).  
Secondly, prospect theory allows the investor to have subjective believes on the probabilities 
of a consequence to occur. This means that the perceived probabilities can be different from 
the stated probability. Consequently, risks associated with particular decisions can be biased 
(Bachmann & Hens, 2008). The introduction of probability weighting makes the theory more 
difficult to work with compared to the expected utility theory.  
Let us now have a closer look at the two abovementioned elements. 
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3.4.2.1 Value function 
The value function is prospect theory’s equivalent of classical economics’ utility function 
(Montier, 2002). There are three essential properties that distinguish the value function from 
the expected utility function: 
 It is defined on deviations from the reference point  
 It is generally concave for gains and convex for losses 
 It is steeper for losses than for gains, implying loss aversion 
3.4.2.1.1 The reference point 
Shefrin defines reference point as “a benchmark used to measure gains and losses” (Shefrin, 
2007). When we say that the value function is defined on deviations from the reference point, 
it implies that people think in terms of gains and losses instead of final wealth. Whether an 
outcome is a gain or a loss depends on the reference point, which is determined by the 
subjective feelings of the individual. It is the benchmark against which all comparisons are 
contrasted (Montier, 2002). For instance, a typical reference point for an investor can be the 
risk-free rate of return. 
However, Kahneman and Tversky stress that the initial position could not be neglected 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In monetary terms a loss of 100 can mean a change into 
poverty for one person, whereas another person does not recognize the loss at all. This is 
because the two persons have different reference points. Therefore the emphasis on changes 
as the carriers of value should not be taken to imply that the value of a particular change is 
independent of the initial position. 
A person can have several reference points, and the perception of the gain or loss differs from 
one reference point to another. The aspiration level is one kind of reference point. It is 
typically linked to past performance. Let us say you buy a house. The price you pay will be 
your initial reference point. The aspiration level could be the historical annual increase in 
house prices. Let us assume you want to sell the house after five years. If you get a price 
above the price you paid for the house, but below the estimated selling price based on the 
price performance in the period you owned the house, you may still achieve this as a gain. It 
depends on your subjective feelings. However, a price below the reference point is always 
perceived as a loss. A price far below the initial reference point would be considered totally 
disappointing in a way that further losses would no longer affect your evaluation. 
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3.4.2.1.2 Concave for gains and convex for losses 
The value function is generally concave for gains and convex for losses. In other words, the 
value function predicts risk aversion in gains and risk seeking in losses. This is fundamentally 
different from the expected utility theory which predicts risk aversion independently of gains 
and losses. A consequence of different curvature of gains and losses is that the marginal value 
for both gains and losses generally decreases with their magnitude. Applied to monetary 
terms, it means that a change from 100 to 200 units has a greater impact on your wealth than a 
change from 2000 to 2100, although the absolute change is the same. The same effect can be 
found for losses. Therefore the value function for changes in wealth is normally concave 
above the reference point, and convex below.  
3.4.2.1.3 Loss aversion 
When we say that the value function is steeper for losses than for gains, this reflects the loss 
aversion and means that losses loom larger than gains in terms of changes in wealth. The 
negative aspects related to losing a sum of money dominate the positive aspects related to 
gaining the same amount. The majority of people find symmetric bets of the form (x, .50; -x, 
.50) distinctly unattractive, and this effect increases with the amount of money at risk.  
3.4.2.1.4 Graphical representation 
Based on the properties described above, the value function could be presented graphically as 
shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 - A graphical presentation of Kahneman and Tversky’s value function (Bachmann & Hens, 2008) 
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We notice that the function is steeper for losses than for gains, and steepest at the reference 
point.  
The main properties ascribed to the value function were thoroughly described by Fishburn and 
Kochenberger (Fishburn & Kochenberger, 1979). They assessed thirty utility functions on 
changes in wealth or return on investment with the aim of examining general features and 
susceptibility to fits by linear, power, and exponential functions. They concluded that the 
most common composite function for gains and losses was convex-concave, which means risk 
seeking behavior in losses and risk-averse behavior in gains. Further, below-target losses 
utility was generally steeper than for gains. They also conclude that power functions give the 
best fits in the majority of convex below-target and concave above-target cases. 
3.4.2.1.5 Mathematical representation 
There are many different functions to represent the just mentioned properties. Figure 11 
displays Tversky and Kahneman’s piecewise power function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1992). 
 
Figure 11 - Kahneman and Tversky’s piecewise power function 
Parameter α represents the median risk aversion of individuals, whereas β represents the loss 
aversion of individuals. Kahneman and Tversky found that α = 0.88 and β = 2.25, based on 
experimental evidence. Remember that these parameters are specific for the piecewise power 
function. 
From Figure 11 we clearly see the difference between gains and losses expressed through the 
piecewise formulation. The loss aversion coefficient β is what distinguishes gains from losses.  
For the piecewise power utility function the pertaining certainty equivalent expression is 
displayed in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12 – Certainty equivalent expression of the power value function 
I leave the discussion about value functions for now, but will return to it later on in this 
section. 
𝐶𝐸 = 𝑃𝑇
1
 + 𝑅𝑃 
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3.4.2.1.6 Choosing the right value function 
There are some commonly accepted criteria that the utility function should satisfy (Bachmann 
& Hens, 2008). Firstly, the utility function for optimal asset allocation should be 
psychologically sound, meaning that the function is reflecting the real behavior of observed 
individuals. Secondly, it should be robust to small changes in input data. Thirdly, it is the 
weight and not the mix of risky assets that should adjust to changes in investor’s preferences. 
In this way it is in line with the two-found separation theorem of Tobin. 
De Giorgi and Hens suggest that one should replace the piecewise power value function of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) with a piecewise negative exponential value function. They 
argue that the piecewise power function has the limitation of unboundedness which makes it 
difficult in applying to finance (Bui, 2009). However, the piecewise negative exponential 
value function also has it disadvantages. For instance, for large outcomes it exhibits more 
curvature and hence the function discourages extreme risk taking (Bui, 2009). For interested 
readers I suggest exploring the article by De Giorgi and Hens (2006).  
In general, one of the problems with the piecewise power function is the lack of robustness to 
small changes in the parameters. However, when scale is irrelevant, the piece-wise power 
utility function could be chosen. Moreover, the piece-wise power value function is the most 
standard and commonly used value function. Indeed, by examining the performance of 27 
different model variants of prospect theory, cumulative prospect theory, and normalized 
prospect theory, on data from an international survey on risk attitude from the Swiss Banking 
Institute, University of Zurich, Tui finds that the best model in terms of minimum sum of 
errors among all the participants in the survey, has a power value function (Bui, 2009). I refer 
to section 3.6.3 for more details about the international risk attitude survey. The choice of 
power function is also in line with the findings of Fishburn and Kochenberger referred to 
earlier in the chapter.  
3.4.2.2 Probability weighting 
Another key difference between prospect theory and utility theory is the concept of perceived 
probabilities. Kahneman and Tversky noted that people tend to give zero weight to relatively 
unlikely outcomes, and a weight of one to relatively certain outcomes (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). For instance, people prefer a lottery ticket with expected value x to the certain gain x. 
Also, people buy insurance, meaning they prefer a certain small loss over a small probability 
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of a big loss, even though the expected value is the same. Similarly results were also found by 
Markowitz (Markowitz, 1952). 
Prospect theory allows for the exaggeration of true probabilities through probability 
weighting. The objective or stated probabilities are adjusted by a probability weighting 
function. The result is that the value of each outcome is multiplied by a decision weight. 
Although similar to stated probabilities for zero and one, probability weights do not obey the 
probability axioms and they should not be interpreted as measures of degree of belief 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
One should remember to discriminate between over-weighting and over-estimation. The latter 
relates to the assessment of the probability of rare events, whereas the former is a property of 
decision weights. When the subject is assumed to adopt the stated probability, there exists no 
over-estimation. However, in real life the two effects may occur simultaneously, increasing 
the impact of rare events (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
The irrationality of probability weighting is discussed in section 3.4.3.  
3.4.2.2.1 Graphical representation 
Based upon the present presentation of properties of the decision weighting, the function can 
be presented graphically as in Figure 13. 
  
Figure 13 - Presentation of a hypothetical weighting function 
As we can see, the function is relatively shallow in the open interval and changes abruptly 
near the end-points where w(0)=0 and w(1)=1. We see that there are discontinuities in the 
function at the endpoints. These represent the notion that there is a limit to how small a 
decision weight can be attached to an event, if it is given any weight at all. People have 
restrictions in their ability to understand and assess extreme probabilities. Therefore, highly 
unlikely events are either ignored or over-weighted, and the difference between high 
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probability and certainty is either neglected or exaggerated. This explains why the function is 
not well-behaved near the end-points (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
To explain the non-linearity of the decision weighting function, the following example is 
fruitful. Imagine you play Russian roulette. You are given the opportunity to purchase a 
removal of one bullet from the gun. Would you pay the same amount to reduce the number of 
bullets from four to three than from one to zero? Most people would pay more for the latter, 
since this reduces the probability of death from one sixth to zero.  
3.4.2.2.2 Analytical representation 
Analytically, the psychological probability weight should be calculated using a probability 
weighting function. Several functions have been proposed, such as Prelec (1998) and Rieger 
and Wang (2005). However, the most used is the one defined by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1992), presented in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14 – Analytical representation of the probability weighting function 
The parameter γ captures the bias in perception of probabilities and has an average value of 
0.65 found in experiments, and a range of 0.27 ≤ γ ≤ 1. The lower the value of the parameter 
is, the stronger the distortion in the perceived probabilities is, and the more distorted is the 
curvature in Figure 13. 
As mentioned earlier, the weighting function is a distortion of the given probability, and not a 
subjective probability (Bachmann & Hens, 2008). Quoting Hens and Bachmann (2008): “An 
individual may agree that the probability of a fair coin landing twice on heads is 0.25, but in 
decision-making the individual acts as if the probability is w(0.25).” Again, notice that the 
distortion occurs when the investor is about to act himself. In other words; what you say you 
do does not match what you actually will do.  
Remember that probability weighting is irrational and should be avoided by separating beliefs 
from risk attitudes (Bachmann & Hens, 2008). 
3.4.2.3 Normalized prospect theory (NPT) 
This customized version of prospect theory normalizes the prospect theory value so that the 
decision weights       add up to one. It is also referred to as smooth prospect theory (Bui, 
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2009). The normalization avoids some violations that the standard prospect theory is subject 
to. The approach goes back to Karmakar (1978). I will use this approach in my calculations. 
Figure 15 displays the normalized prospect theory. 
 
Figure 15 – Normalized prospect theory (NPT) 
We have seen how the need for a new decision theory arose on the failures of the mean-
variance analysis and the expected utility to describe actual behavior. Prospect theory is the 
best quantitative theory we have in decision making when it comes to including psychological 
aspects.  
3.4.3 Criticism - Is prospect theory rational? 
In classical finance theory one typically perceives that traditional finance defines a rational 
benchmark, and all behaviorally motivated decisions of the investors are irrational (Bachmann 
& Hens, 2008). Therefore one can argue that any model based on behavioral aspects generates 
irrational results.  
However, this perception is not necessarily true. While some of the behavioral aspects of 
investors are irrational, others are not. Put in other words, not all psychologically determined 
decisions as documented by the behavioral finance research are irrational (Bachmann & Hens, 
2008). The discussion of rationality versus irrationality therefore has to be more nuanced.  
Hens et al. argue that prospect theory can be made consistent with rational choice and the 
mean-variance analysis (Bachmann & Hens, 2008). Indeed, there is only one aspect of 
prospect theory that is clearly irrational, and that is probability weighting. However, assuming 
a rational investor he separates beliefs and risk attitudes. He does not use his intuition when 
assessing probabilities, but sticks to the stated probability, hence he has no distortion in his 
perception of probabilities, and γ is equal to one. 
Indeed, when there is no probability weighting, which is the case when γ is equal to one, Hens 
and Bachmann (2008) show that in the two-period model prospect theory is consistent with 
rational choice. This is because as in expected utility, prospect theory separates beliefs and 
risk attitudes and for γ equal to one the objective function is linear in probabilities. Indeed, it 
has been well know in expected utility theory that any increasing function can serve as a 
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rational utility from wealth. For instance, Friedman and Savage suggested a double s-shaped 
function (Friedman & Savage, 1948). In this sense Kahneman and Tversky’s point is just to 
suggest a single s-shaped utility with a kink. Note that mean-variance would however violate 
the rationality requirement of expected utility because of two reasons; firstly a variance is not 
linear in probabilities and secondly mean-variance utility functions are not strictly increasing.  
In the case of loss aversion, risk aversion, and reference point, they are all aspects of the 
prospect theory which can be explained by rational behavior. For instance, basing one’s 
decision on reference points is not necessarily irrational. When they are realistic and stable, 
goals that will be achieved in the future do not contradict rational decision-making 
(Bachmann & Hens, 2008). However, if reference points are used to justify previous decisions 
or if they change very often in the course of an investment, then irrational decisions may 
result. Another example of aspects of prospect theory which can be explained by rational 
behavior is the loss aversion. One can argue that it is part of the investors’ preferences, hence 
it is not irrational. 
Rejecting prospect theory based upon the rationality criteria of decision making is therefore 
not necessarily right. Prospect theory can very well be rational.  
3.5 The behavioral investor 
Approaching the analysis of structured products, it is high time to describe the investment 
needs of the behavioral investor. This section will deal with how products could be designed 
to feed these needs. 
3.5.1 The role of the banks 
Banks provide services to their clients. One of these services is to offer investment products 
that best suit the clients’ preferences. Since the bank has superior access to and superior 
knowledge about financial markets, this service is profitable for the bank. Clients are willing 
to pay for this knowledge and superior access to markets. In this way they can invest in assets 
and have risk-return trade-offs that are not otherwise directly available on the market 
(Bachmann & Hens, 2008). Moreover, the banks realize economies of scales on hedging costs 
which the client could not achieve as an individual in the market. Further, the banks use their 
knowledge to structure products the clients lack knowledge to do.  
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3.5.2 Product development  
Keeping in mind that behavioral clients are particularly sensitive to losses, fairness of the 
distribution of profits between the bank and the clients, and finally the relative return related 
to the reference point, the behavioral investor is willing to pay for a product taking these 
properties into account. That is to say, the behavioral investor would like a product that 
protects from returns below the reference point, that allows for a fair participation in the 
returns above the reference point, and that allows for some gambling to obtain particularly 
high returns despite the low probability. Remember that the behavioral investor always 
prefers to pay indirectly in terms of opportunity costs to paying directly by cash.  
The preferences of the behavioral investor could be illustrated in a payoff diagram. Such a 
diagram is displayed in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16 – Desired payoff by a behavioral client (Bachmann & Hens, 2008) 
The slope of the payoff of the structured product is red, whereas the slope of the basket of 
underlying is black and dotted. 100 is the par value of the investment. As we can see, the 
desired structured product consists of three elements. The first element is the capital 
protection which protects the client from returns below the reference point. The higher the 
loss aversion is the stronger is the client’s willingness to pay for this protection. The client 
pays for this protection by reducing the participation in the underlying, hence the upside 
potential, which is the second element of the product and referred to as fair participation. This 
is illustrated by a slightly flatter slope of the structured product in this zone than the slope of 
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the underlying. The third element of the structured product is the gambling. We see that the 
payoff increases sharply when entering into the gambling zone of the product. Since a 
behavioral investor tends to overweight unlikely outcomes, a gambling component is likely to 
be perceived as more attractive compared to an investment in the underlying.  
3.5.3 The optimal product 
Assuming that an investor’s portfolio only consists of a structured product, we can look at the 
design of an optimal product. Assuming a behavioral investor, the value function is the 
starting point. Moreover, assuming loss aversion and diminishing marginal utility for gains 
and losses, the investor will prefer to give up some of the upside in order to be protected from 
small to medium losses. However, above a certain limit, incremental loss or gain do not 
reduce or add any value. Therefore there is no desire to have a capital protection for big 
losses. In the same way there is no desire to participate in big gains.  
Based on these properties, the optimal product could look like a typical barrier product 
presented in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17 – Payoff diagram of a possible optimal structured product (Bachmann & Hens, 2008) 
However, so far probability weighting is not taken into account. The introduction of 
probability weighting would affect the optimal payoff since the extremes receive more 
weight. The change in preferences due to subjective perceptions of probabilities would result 
in different levels of the cap and the floor, depending on each investor’s perceptions. We 
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would need to conduct a numerical analysis to draw any conclusions. I will not do so in this 
paper. For interested readers I would recommend the article by Hens and Rieger (2008) for a 
thorough investigation of the optimal structured product. 
A structured product that offers a similar payoff to Figure 17 is the bonus certificate. It offers 
capital protection until a certain limit or barrier. Below this barrier the payoff is equal to the 
payoff of the underlying and the protection is lost even though the underlying should have a 
positive development.  
The Swiss Design Institute for Finance and Banking conducted a field study where visitors at 
a public exhibition got to design the structured product they would prefer. More than 600 
individuals did participate. The survey revealed that 49 percent of the population preferred a 
capital protection product with approximately 96 percent capital protection and a slightly 
reduced participation. Additionally, 18.9 percent preferred a capital protection product with 
100 percent capital protection, reduced participation, and a cap. This proves the popularity of 
capital protection products and explains why the majority of structured products include 
capital protection. Moreover, it emphasizes the importance of loss aversion in investment 
decisions of private investors (Bachmann & Hens, 2008). 
3.6 Cultural dimensions and investors’ behavior 
Deviations from the rational choice can be linked to cultural differences. Culture is central to 
how individuals perceive the world, how they think, and how they make decisions. The 
importance of cultural differences is acknowledged in many contexts. However, cultural 
differences have not yet gained proper attention from the finance research community. One 
reason could be that for a long time finance has been considered a discipline focusing strictly 
on how rational agents make optimal decisions under perfect or imperfect conditions.  
With the rise of behavioral finance and its psychological aspects, it is natural to include 
cultural factors in the analysis (Hens & Wang, 2007). Indeed, Hens and Wang show that 
cultural differences do matter for financial decisions (Hens & Wang, 2007). They show that 
cultural differences lead to systematic deviations from rational decision making, which in turn 
lead to cultural differences in risk taking, which finally will lead to cultural differences in 
investment choices among investors. More precisely, they show that culture can influence 
risk-attitudes, probabilistic thinking, and overconfidence tendency. This may lead to different 
patterns in investment behavior and market trends across countries and regions. 
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As the world is globalizing, cultures confront and interact. This has implications for our 
society, the world of finance included. To understand the culture’s impact on investment 
decisions and preferences is therefore highly necessary (Hens & Wang, 2007). 
3.6.1 Understanding the culture’s impact on investment decisions 
The academic work on culture is comprehensive. Perhaps the most famous work is the 
cultural dimensions defined by the Dutch researcher Geert Hofstede (Hofstede, 2001). Despite 
its key role in social science and economics, his theory is under-researched in finance (Hens 
& Wang, 2007). 
Hofstede’s framework organizes culture into five dimensions. This simplification of a 
complex subject is convenient because it makes the rather abstract notion of culture more 
tangible. Further, Hofstede’s framework allows for a numerical comparison of cultures. This 
quantification of culture facilitates the understanding of where the cultures actually differ. 
However, one should bear in mind that a simplification of a complex subject has its negative 
sides, such as the absences of nuances, cultural paradoxes and the risk of stereotyping.  
Hofstede synthesizes culture into five dimensions as shown in Figure 18. A short description 
of each dimension follows.  
 
Figure 18 – Hofstede’s five dimensions of culture 
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Uncertainty avoidance is about whether people prefer the predictable (high uncertainty 
avoidance) or the unpredictable (low uncertainty avoidance). Societies of high uncertainty 
avoidance are based upon a high degree of regulation. Opposite, an uncertainty loving culture 
is tolerant towards diverging opinions and the level of formal regulation in society is low. 
People in this culture are not expected to express feelings.  
Individualism vs. collectivism looks at how needs or achievements of one person are valued 
compared to the achievements or needs of the group as a whole. Is everyone expected to take 
care of themselves, or is one strictly connected to an extended family where loyalty is highly 
valued?  
Masculinity deals with how well the gender roles are defined and expressed in the culture. 
Strictly defined gender roles are found in masculine culture. Here men’s and women’s values 
differ significantly. In a feminine culture the roles and values of men and women are quite 
alike. Here one would expect to find modest and caring men, more or less like women, 
opposite to the assertive and competitive in the masculine culture. 
Power distance is about equality versus inequality. A hierarchical culture typically has high 
power distance while an egalitarian culture has low power distance. Moreover power distance 
refers to the degree of inequality accepted within the culture. 
Long-term vs. short-term orientation concerns the importance attached to the past and the 
present versus the future. In long-term oriented societies, people value actions and attributes 
that affect the future, such as persistence and perseverance, thrift, and shame. Contrarily, in 
short-term oriented societies, people value actions and attitudes that are affected by the past or 
the present such as normative statements, immediate stability, protecting one’s own face, 
respect for tradition, favors, gifts and so forth. 
A little warning on the use and relevancy of cultural dimensions should be included. Cultural 
dimensions were constructed in order to compare cultures and generate understanding. 
However, one should never interpret and use these dimensions without contingency. 
Generalizations must never be exploited and defined as the truth for every single group or 
individual. Subcultures and subgroups exist in every culture, and cultural paradoxes are 
everywhere. An unanticipated consequence of using the dimensions is the danger of 
stereotyping entire cultures (Osland, Bird, Delano, & Jacob, 2000).  
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3.6.2 Comparison of Switzerland and Norway 
Based on the five dimensions Hofstede made a ranking of all the involved countries. This 
ranking could be used as a proxy on the property of a culture. Figure 19 shows the results for 
Switzerland and Norway. The higher the number, the stronger the dimension. 
 
Figure 19 - Cultural differences based on Hofstede’s cultural dimension score 
As we can see from Figure 19, the main difference between Switzerland and Norway lies 
within the dimension of masculinity where the difference is very strong. There is also a 
difference in terms of uncertainty avoidance.  The former is hard to discuss from a behavioral 
point of view. Contrarily, the latter is highly interesting. The dimension captures the attitudes 
towards ambiguous situations, which is related to general risk attitudes (Bachmann & Hens, 
2008). Since Swiss people, therein investors, in general are more uncertainty avoidant, it 
follows that their risk taking should be limited relative to the Norwegian people, therein 
investors. Consequently the loss aversion and the risk aversion should be higher. Highly 
relevant to this are the results of a survey conducted by Swiss Banking Institute. 
3.6.3 The INTRA study 
3.6.3.1 Data 
Hans, Rieger, and Wang on behalf of the Swiss Banking Institute at the University of Zurich 
have conducted one of the most systematic and comprehensive studies on cultural differences 
in decision-making (Bachmann & Hens, 2008). This international study involves 45 countries 
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and 5912 participants in different countries around the world. The participants are 
undergraduate business students. In Zurich answers from business students were compared to 
answers from students with other specializations as well as practitioners from banks.  
The respondents were given a questionnaire including three time-preference questions, one 
question about ambiguity aversion, ten lottery questions, and 19 questions about happiness. 
Additionally they were asked to disclose their nationality, culture origin and some other 
personal information.  
The data from the study was used to compute country level parameter values for all possible 
combinations for three prospect theory models, three probability weighting functions and 
three value functions. 
3.6.3.2 Comparing Switzerland to Norway 
From the survey we can find data for risk aversion, loss aversion, and decision weighting for 
normalized prospect theory with a Kahneman and Tversky probability weighting function and 
a piecewise power value function. Table 3.1 displays these data for Switzerland and Norway. 
 
Table 3.1– Prospect theory parameter values of Norwegian and Swiss investors 
We see that the Norwegian investor is more risk averse for gains and for losses, than the 
Swiss investor. Swiss investors are twice as sensitive to losses as the Norwegians which 
actually have a lower sensibility to losses than to gains.The two investors have practically the 
same perception of probabilities.  
 
  
Country α+ α- β γ
Norway 0,52 0,81 0,96 0,61
Switzerland 0,41 0,74 1,98 0,60
Germany 0,39 0,71 4,43 0,55
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4 Utility calculations of structured products 
In this chapter I will investigate how the access to structured products can affect the utility of 
small, Norwegian private investors. More precisely I will analyze how the enhanced 
investment opportunities from structured products affect the investor’s utility, and whether 
structured products return higher utility than at one hand bank deposits, and at the other hand 
the best alternative market investment. Ultimately I will conclude whether it was a sound 
decision to practically ban structured products in Norway in 2008. 
In section 4.1 and 4.2 I go through the necessary explanations, assumptions and parameters 
one needs to understand the analysis. From section 4.3 to 4.10 I present the products and the 
respective analysis. Finally, in section 4.11 I discuss my findings, herein how my results are 
affected when I change the parameters and assumptions. 
4.1 Introduction to the analysis 
Before we go into the utility analysis of each product, it is necessary to have an understanding 
of the assumptions and parameters used, as well as of the calculation process itself. 
4.1.1 The rationale of the analysis 
To see how the access to structured products can affect the utility of small, private investors, 
it would be meaningless to present only the utility achieved from the structured product. We 
need to compare the utility of the investment in the structured product to the best alternative 
investments and then analyze the utility improvement.  
I assume there are two realistic alternative investments to structured products. One is a 
classical portfolio investment, and the other is a bank deposit. The typical investor in 
structured products in Norway is a small, private investor. Structured products are distributed 
by the banks, which we have seen have been pushing structured products quite aggressively to 
clients. I assume the clients can roughly be divided into two groups; those that have 
knowledge or are familiar to market investments and that have invested in stock markets 
before, and those that have no experience or knowledge about market investments, and that 
keep all their money in a savings account.  
The latter group of clients can chose between a structured product investment and a risk-free 
investment represented by a bank deposit. The former group of clients can chose between the 
structured product investment and a classical portfolio investment. This classical portfolio is 
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the investor’s optimal combination of the basket of assets underlying the structured product, 
and a risk-free asset, referred to as the optimal Markowitz portfolio in chapter three.  
The enhanced investment opportunities from structured products are in this paper expressed 
through having the possibility to do non-linear investments compared to only having access to 
the optimal Markowitz portfolio. I refer to the utility effect from the non-linear investment as 
the free design effect. To measure the free design effect I compare the utility of the optimal 
classical portfolio investment to the utility of the structured product investment. In other 
words I compare the utility of a linear combination of assets, a classical investment, to the 
utility of a non-linear combination of the very same assets, a structured product investment.  
The non-linear combinations are represented by structured products offered in the Norwegian 
market. The sample is presented in section 4.1.3. As we saw in chapter two investments in 
structured products are subject to fees, and the underlying assets do not usually pay any 
dividends. To isolate the free design effect, these properties have to be embedded in the 
classical investment alternative. However, such assumptions are not realistic in the real world 
the classical investor faces. For instance, if the classical investor invests in stocks he can 
expect to receive dividends, and he pays small or no fees.  
I therefore need to define two different classical investments; one to represent the utility 
change as an effect of the free design, and one to express the utility change between the 
structured product and a realistic real-world optimal linear investment alternative. I will refer 
to the realistic real-world alternative as the realistic classical investment, CR, and the 
alternative that represents the free design effect as the adjusted classical investment, CF.  
4.1.2 Calculation process 
The inputs to the calculations are probability distributions of returns. We need the 
distributions of both the structured products’ returns and the underlying baskets’ returns. The 
input data is crucial for the model and the result, and is thoroughly discussed in section 4.1.4.  
We start the process by probability weighting the return probabilities for all return states of 
both the structured product and the basket of underlying assets. Thereafter we find the 
normalized prospect theory utility for each of the return states by multiplying the normalized 
weighted probabilities with the piecewise power function utility.  
Next, for the classical portfolios, we optimize the utilities of the portfolios by optimizing the 
allocation between the risk-free asset and the basket of underlying assets. After this, we 
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summarize the prospect theory utilities of the structured product and the now optimized 
classical portfolios, and convert the utilities into certainty equivalents.  
Finally, we adjust for dividends and fees to find the certainty equivalent returns of the 
structured products and the CR and CF investments. We now have three different utilities 
expressed in certainty equivalent returns, in addition to the risk-free investment, which we can 
compare to find the change in utility by investing in structured products compared to classical 
investments and risk-free investments. Figure 20 shows a summary of the different steps of 
the analysis process. 
 
Figure 20 – The different steps of the analysis process 
4.1.3 Product sample 
In this section I present the criteria based on which I have chosen the structured products to be 
evaluated. I also present the products briefly. A thorough presentation of the products follows 
as a part of the analysis.  
4.1.3.1 Criteria 
The sample is based upon two criteria; representativeness and diversity. 
Let me first address the representativeness criterion. In order to conclude on the Norwegian 
market for structured products, the data sample has to be representative. As we can read in 
chapter two, DnB Global 2000/2006 is the product that has sold the most based upon issued 
One
• Weighting the probabilities
Two
• Finding the normalized prospect theory utility for each return 
state
Three
• Optimizing the classical portfolios
Four
• Converting aggregated utilities into certainty equivalent 
returns
Five
• Adjusting for dividends and fees to find the adjusted certainty 
equivalent of the three scenarios
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amount (Trustee, 2010). Based purely upon volume this could be said to be a qualified 
representative of the Norwegian market.  
In an email from DnB NOR dated Tuesday 4 May 2010, they write that “there have been 
many different types of structured products in the Norwegian market the last decade, but in 
line with my experience the structure of the Global and Sektor is the one that have been the 
most frequent. However, a term of six years is probably far above the average. The majority 
of the [structured] products have had a term of three to five years”. In other words, the 
structure of DnB Global 2000/2006 and DnB Sektor 2000/2006 is representative although the 
term is somewhat long.  
The very same products have been analyzed in a report about expected return on AIOs 
(Koekebakker & Zakamouline, 2006). On question about whether he believes that the DnB 
Global 2000/2006 product is representative for the Norwegian market of structured products, 
one of the co-authors answers that “I believe that both DnB Global 2000/2006 and DnB 
Sektor 2000/2006 are fairly representative for the Norwegian market” (Zakamouline, 2010). 
Further, according to Lindset (2008), DnB Global and DnB Sektor are representative 
examples of structured products marketed in Norway at the start of the century (Lindset, 
2008). 
I conclude that DnB Global 2000/2006 and DnB Sektor 2000/2006 could be regarded as 
representative products offered in the Norwegian market.  
Having concluded on the representativeness of my sample, I turn to the diversity criterion. It 
is important to include products that reflect different properties. More precisely, I want to 
include products linked to different underlying indices and asset classes, as well as different 
terms and payoff structures. Also, it is important to investigate products sold by a variety of 
institutions. To fulfill the criterion, I have included six products in addition to the two 
representative products. 
To conclude on the sample as a whole, we can say that eight products have been chosen 
which represent both the most popular products in terms of volumes, and the variety of 
different products offered in the Norwegian market. 
4.1.3.2 Presentation of the sample 
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the eight products included in my sample.  
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Product Type Underlying Dataset provider 
 DnB Global 00/06 AIO 
 Euro STOXX 50 
 S&P500 
 Nikkei225 
 Koekebakker and 
Zakamouline 
 DnB Sektor 00/06 AIO 
 Euro STOXX healthcare 
 Euro STOXX Telecom 
 Euro STOXX Bank 
 Koekebakker and 
Zakamouline 
 Orkla Finans Absolutt 
Europa II 2007-2012 
BMA  Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50   Bøe 
 Fokus Bank 
Råvareindeksobligasjon 
Olje 2007-2008 
AIO  WTI light sweet crude futures  Bøe 
 Acta Japansk Eiendom 
2007-2010 
BMA 
 Tokyo Stock Exchange REIT 
index 
 Bøe 
 Nordea Lock-in Basket 
2006-2010 
AIO 
 Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 
 Tokyo Stock Price Index 
 Hang Seng index  
 S&P BRIC 40 Euro index 
 Bøe 
 DnB Nor Kraft 
2007/2009 
AIO 
 Nord Pool electricity price 
forwards 
 Bøe 
 Storebrand Spread 
Aksjeindeksobligasjon 
2006-2010 
AIO 
 Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50  
 Russell 2000 
 Bøe 
Table 4.1 - Overview of the sample of structured products 
We see that the datasets on the first two products are provided by Koekebakker and 
Zakamouline, whereas Bøe has produced the sets for the other six products. I will elaborate on 
the datasets in section 4.1.4. Six products are AIOs whereas two are BMAs. The term of the 
products varies from 18 months to six years, and the products are issued throughout the 
2000s. There are six different institutions involved and 13 different indices. 
Despite the diversity there are some generic properties of the sample. Firstly, they all include 
a capital protection. Secondly, the options employed are quanto options. This means that the 
underlying indices are price indices only, and not adjusted for dividends. Thirdly, the returns 
on the indices are calculated in local currency eliminating the currency risk. Fourthly, with the 
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exception of one product, the options have Asiatic tales meaning that the final value of the 
product is determined by an arithmetic average over a time period of varying length. The 
longer period the average is based upon, the lower is the variance and by consequence the 
expected return. The products may also have their starting value calculated by an arithmetic 
average.  
4.1.4 Dataset 
The datasets refer to the input data used in my estimations. As mentioned earlier, the input 
data used in the analysis is the probability distributions of both the structured products’ 
returns and the underlying baskets’ returns.  
The return distributions of the structured products cannot be found in any database. They have 
to be simulated. One way of estimating is Monte Carlo simulation technique which generates 
simulated returns based upon a set of assumptions and parameters. Indeed, this technique has 
been employed by Professor Steen Koekebakker and Associate Professor Valeri Zakamouline 
at the University of Agder to simulate the expected return on DnB Global 2000/20006 and 
DnB Sektor 2000/2006 (Koekebakker & Zakamouline, 2006). Another analysis of expected 
returns of structured products in Norway has been conducted by Geir Bøe, a PhD student at 
the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH). He wrote his 
master thesis on estimating the expected return on six different structured products sold by six 
different institutions (Bøe, 2007).  
On request I have gotten access to the datasets from the two abovementioned papers. In the 
following I elaborate on these datasets. I refer to Koekebakker and Zakamouline (2007) and 
Bøe (2007) page 73 to 89 for thorough explanations of the simulation processes. 
4.1.4.1 Datasets from Koekebakker and Zakamouline 
As we can see from Table 4.1, Koekebakker and Zakamouline have provided me with the 
datasets of DnB Global 2000/2006 and DnB Sektor 2000/2006. The datasets include 
probability distributions of returns of both the structured products and their underlying 
baskets of assets.  
4.1.4.1.1 Key findings  
In their report Koekebakker and Zakamouline conclude that the expected returns of the two 
products in question were only marginally higher than the risk-free rate of return. A gearing 
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of the products would cause the expected returns to be negative, based on the authors’ 
assumptions.  
4.1.4.1.2 Credibility 
DnB Markets conducted their own analysis of the products as a response to Koekebakker and 
Zakamouline’s findings where they conclude that the estimated returns are positive for both 
an equity-based investment and a leveraged investment (Johnsen, 2008). A third analysis on 
the same products was conducted by NHH professor Thore Johnsen on request by 
Bankklagenemda in order to have an external, objective expert’s view. His findings support 
the conclusion by Koekebakker and Zakamouline that the expected return on a fully leveraged 
investment is negative for both products. His annual returns on the equity-financed 
investments are about 0.75 percent higher than Koekebakker and Zakamouline’s. However, 
Johnsen explains this difference by diverging assumptions on additive log-normality 
(Johnsen, 2008).  
Johnsen concludes that a significant part of the differences between DnB Markets’ report and 
Koekebakker and Zakamouline’s report is attributed to the use of different return models. He 
further concludes that one should trust the two reasearchers’ model, since it is more 
elaborated (Johnsen, 2008).  
Based upon this we can conclude that the datasets from Koekebakker and Zakamouline are 
reliable. However, we keep in mind that different assumptions and models generate 
significantly different results. 
4.1.4.2 Datasets from Bøe 
Bøe have provided me with datasets for six structured products, as we can see from Table 4.1. 
However, the datasets from Bøe do only include the probability distributions of returns of the 
structured products, and not of the underlying basket of assets.  
4.1.4.2.1 Key findings 
From Bøe’s valuation and estimation of expected returns on six structured products, Bøe 
concludes that the criticism of structured products is legitimate and appropriate. He finds that 
the investor pays from eight to ten percent in fees on a typical product, which is two to four 
percent higher than what is stated in the prospects. Moreover, the expected return on a fully 
equity-financed investment in a structured product is on the same level as the risk-free return, 
whereas the expected return of the fully leverage investment is negative. 
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4.1.4.2.2 Credibility 
Bøe’s master thesis attracted attention from media, and is referred to in several articles, such 
as (Slettan, 2007) and (Moe, 2007). Further, strengthening the credibility of the report is the 
fact that the supervisor of the report, professor Petter Bjerksund at NHH, has spent a lot of 
time analyzing structured products (Leirvåg, 2010), has been used as an expert witness on 
structured products in court (Andersson, 2010), and written papers on the same subject 
(Bjerksund, 2008).  
Based on the abovementioned, and the fact that Bøe’s findings are in line with the conclusions 
of Koekebakker and Zakamouline, and Johnsen, I consider Bøe’s data as reliable and 
objective. 
4.1.4.2.3 Finding the distribution of the underlying 
As mentioned above, Bøe’s datasets do not include the return distributions of the underlying 
assets, which I need to conduct my analysis. In order to get these data I face several potential 
solutions. A stringent solution is to use the Monte Carlo simulation technique based upon the 
same assumptions as Bøe on the underlying baskets of the structured products. However, this 
paper is not about Monte Carlo simulations and I consider that option out of the scope of the 
paper.  
Another solution is to assume that future distributions are equivalent to historical 
distributions, and thereby using the historical probability distributions of returns of the 
underlying baskets. Actually, this is how both Bøe and Koekebakker and Zakamouline find 
many of their input variables such as the volatility. Unfortunately, the historical data for some 
of the indices is limited and this decreases the quality of the assumptions.  
A third solution is to assume that the returns of the underlying assets are normally distributed. 
However, we know that the distributions of returns historically are skewed and actually have 
fat tails. By assuming normal distributions we exclude these tails. Due to the probability 
weighting in prospect theory, these fat tails are relatively more important than in classical 
decision theory, and should be reflected in the datasets.  
Despite these drawbacks I choose to assume normal distributions of the underlying assets. To 
find the probability distributions of returns I integrate the normal distribution function over 
the desired return interval and the number of states. Due to the drawbacks mentioned above, 
the credibility of the datasets of the underlying baskets of the six products analyzed by Bøe is 
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limited, and we should be careful about drawing conclusions upon them. The distribution of 
the underlying basket of assets of Nordea and Storebrand’s products were not produced due to 
the restricted amount of data available.  
4.1.4.2.4 Calibration of the structured products’ distribution data 
In opposition to the limited amount of data on the underlying baskets of assets, I have datasets 
of the probability distributions of all the structured products’ returns. However, there is a 
problem in Bøe’s probability distributions of the structured products’ returns. The number of 
return states is limited so that the range of the return states is only from zero to 25 percent 
annual return. Probabilities of annual returns above 25 percent are pooled into one state. This 
is unfortunate due to the probability weighting in prospect theory. I have therefore modified 
the dataset to include return states up till 45 percent. The calibration is described in detail in 
appendix A.  
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4.1.4.3 Quality of the datasets 
Based on the discussion above, we understand that the quality of the datasets varies. A 
summary of the discussion is presented in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21 – The quality of the datasets for each product 
The products having the datasets with the highest quality are DnB Global and DnB Sektor. I 
will therefore put most weight on the results from the analysis of these two products when 
analyzing the findings. Fortunately these two products are representative for the market, as 
concluded in section 4.1.3.  
4.2 Generic assumptions and criteria 
In this section I discuss the generic assumptions and parameters. For product specific 
assumptions and parameters, I refer to the analysis of each product. 
Product Comments
Structured product Underlying
DnB Global 00/06 Very good Very good
Dataset for both structured product and 
underlying provided by Koekebakker and 
Zakamouline.
DnB Sektor 00/06 Very good Very good
Dataset for both structured product and 
underlying provided by Koekebakker and 
Zakamouline.
Orkla Finans Absolutt 
Europa II 2007-2012
Good Poor
Bøe's dataset for the structured product has 
been calibrated. Normal distribution 
assumption on underlying, but results are not 
quantitatively reliable.
Fokus Bank 
Råvareindeksobligasjon 
Olje 2007-2008
Good Poor
Bøe's dataset for the structured product has 
been calibrated. Normal distribution 
assumption on underlying, but results are not 
quantitatively reliable.
Acta Japansk Eiendom 
2007-2010
Good Poor
Bøe's dataset for the structured product has 
been calibrated. Normal distribution 
assumption on underlying, but results are not 
quantitatively reliable.
DnB Nor Kraft 
2007/2009
Good Poor
Bøe's dataset for the structured product has 
been calibrated. Normal distribution 
assumption on underlying, but results are not 
quantitatively reliable.
Nordea Lock-in Basket 
2006-2010
Good No data Bøe's dataset for the structured product has 
been calibrated. No data on underlying.
Storebrand Spread 
Aksjeindeksobligasjon 
2006-2010
Good No data Bøe's dataset for the structured product has 
been calibrated. No data on underlying.
Quality of dataset
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4.2.1 Financing 
We know that debt-financing of structured products was very frequent in the Norwegian 
market. Hence, it could be interesting to include effects of debt financing in the analysis. As 
we have seen, this has been done by Bøe and Koekebakker and Zakamouline, and the effect is 
a decrease in the expected return of the structured products. Indeed, some of the products even 
have negative expected returns according to the calculations.  
I will strictly focus on 100 percent equity financing in this paper. I refer to the other papers for 
a better understanding of the effects of debt financing, such as Quinn (2009), Bøe (2007), 
Johnsen (2008), and Koekebakker and Zakamouline (2006) to mention a few. 
4.2.2 Invested amount 
An assumption on the size of the invested amount is necessary to decide the size of the fees 
included in the estimations, since the fees are contingent on the invested amount.  
I assume that we are dealing with the typical Norwegian investor as defined in chapter two. 
As we have seen, this is a small, private investor that. I therefore assume that the invested 
amount is NOK500,000.  
4.2.3 Risk-free rate of return and the reference point 
The risk-free rate employed on the structured product depends on when the product was 
issued and the term of the product. The prospects of the structured products normally 
emphasize that the products are designed for investors who have the intention to hold the 
investment to maturity. If the products are sold before maturity, the investors are not 
guaranteed the invested amount back. Based on this, it is reasonable to employ the return rate 
from a risk-free investment with the same term as the structured product. To keep consistency 
between parameters and input data, I have chosen to use the same risk-free interest rates as 
used in the generation of the input data, which is the effective return on Norwegian 
governmental bond issued for the same period as the structured product. 
The reference point, RP, is if not differently stated the risk-free rate of return for each 
structured product. 
4.2.4 Prospect theory parameters 
To estimate the prospect theory utility I use the piecewise power value function, Tversky-
Kahneman probability weighting and normalized prospect theory. If not explicitly stated, I 
use the classical prospect theory parameters found by Kahneman and Tversky (1992):  
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 The risk aversion (α) for gains and losses is 0.88 
 The loss aversion (β) is 2.25 
 The bias in perception of probabilities, the probability weighting factor (γ) is 0.65 
4.3 DnB Global 2000/2006 
4.3.1 Description of the product 
The product is an AIO. It combines a zero-coupon bond issued at par value, with a long 
position in a call option. At maturity the investor receives the invested amount in addition to a 
return dependent on the development in three underlying stock indices in Europe, USA, and 
Japan, namely Euro STOXX50, S&P500 and Nikkei225. The weighting is 50 percent, 25 
percent, and 25 percent respectively. The participation is 105 percent and the investment 
period is six years. The note was issued on 24 November 2000 by DnB with expiration on 24 
November 2006. 
For investments in the range of NOK10,000 to NOK1,000,000 the fees are 4.5 percent for the 
ordinary customer. This means that the total amount paid to DnB is the principal plus the fees. 
Its payoff diagram is illustrated in Figure 22. The payoff diagram illustrates the payoff of the 
structured product for any return state of the underlying, denoted ST in the diagram. It is 
critical to emphasize that the underlying in the payoff diagrams does not refer to the 
underlying baskets of assets applied in the optimal classical investments, CF and CR. The 
underlying in the diagrams is not adjusted for fees or dividends. This is because the payoff 
diagrams are meant to illustrate the structured products’ payoff in different return states of the 
underlying assets so that the reader can get a visual impression of how the structured products 
perform. The diagrams must not be misinterpreted as accurate descriptions of the payoffs of 
the structured product. However, for illustrative purposes they describe the payoff design of 
the structured products sufficiently. 
The above mentioned properties apply to all payoff diagrams in this chapter. 
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Figure 22 – Payoff diagram of DnB Global 2000/2006 
4.3.2 Product specific parameters 
The annual effective risk-free rate of return is estimated from the effective annual return of 
the Norwegian governmental bond for the relevant period. It is 6.30 percent. 
4.3.3 Utility calculations 
The results of the utility calculations are summarized in Figure 23. All utilities are expressed 
in terms of certainty equivalent interest rates. 
 
 
Figure 23 – Utility calculations of DnB Global 2000/2006 and the respective alternative investments 
SP
Risk-free rate
6.30%
Investment
CE
CF CR
6.41%
4.25%
6.64%
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SP is the structured product, CF is the adjusted classical investment, whereas CR is the realistic 
classical investment. The utility of the structured product is 6.41 percent. The CF investment 
has a utility of 4.25 percent, and the CR investment has a utility of 6.64 percent. The 
investment that yields the highest utility is the CR investment. The optimal portfolio has a 
proportion of 100 percent invested in the basket of risky assets. 
4.4  DnB Sektor 2000/2006 
4.4.1 Description of the product 
This is an AIO which combines a zero-coupon bond issued at par value, with a long position 
in a call option. At maturity the investor receives the invested amount in addition to a return 
dependent on the development in three underlying industry specific European stock indices. 
The three indices, STOXX Healthcare, STOXX Telecom, and EURO STOXX Bank, are 
weighted equally. The participation is 100 percent, and the investment period is six years. The 
note was issued on 24 November 2000 by DnB with expiration on 24 November 2006.  
Fees are 4.5 percent of the invested amount if the latter is between NOK10,000 and 
NOK1,000,000 and the investor is an ordinary client. 
The payoff diagram of the product is illustrated in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24 – Payoff diagram of DnB Sektor 2000/2006 
4.4.2 Product specific parameters 
This product has the same term and is issued for the same period as DnB Global 00/06. I 
therefore use the same effective annual risk-free rate, which is 6.30 percent. 
65 
 
4.4.3 Utility calculations 
The results of the utility calculations are summarized in Figure 25. All utilities are expressed 
in terms of certainty equivalent interest rates. 
 
Figure 25 - Utility calculations of DnB Sektor 2000/2006 and the respective alternative investments 
The structured product has a utility of 6.53 percent. The utility of the CF investment is 3.49 
percent whereas an investment in the CR has a utility of 6.30 percent. The optimal classical 
portfolio has an allocation of 100 percent in the risk-free asset. The scenario that yields the 
highest utility is the investment in the structured product.  
4.5 Orkla Finans Absolutt Europa II 
4.5.1 Description of the product 
This product is a combination of a bank deposit and a put and a call linked to the Dow Jones 
Euro Stoxx 50. It has an investment period of just above six years, which runs from 27 March 
2007 with maturity on 27 April 2012. While you are guaranteed to have your money back at 
maturity, your profit increases if the index augments and if it falls. However, the put is limited 
by a knock-out meaning that if the underlying at any time drops more than 50 percent, the put 
option becomes worthless. 
Fees amount to five percent for investments in the range of NOK100,000 to NOK1,999,999. 
The product’s payoff diagram is shown in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26 – Payoff diagram of Orkla Finans Absolutt Europa II 
4.5.2 Product specific parameters 
We need the effective risk-free annual rate of return. We estimate this from the five-year 
Norwegian governmental bond for the relevant period, which is 4.49 percent.  
I need to estimate the probability distribution of the underlying assets on this and the 
remaining products of my sample, as discussed in section 4.1.4. To estimate the normal 
distribution I need the volatility and the expected return. I need the dividend rate to find 
comparable certainty equivalent returns. 
As of 3 March 2007 the dividend yield for DJ EuroStoxx 50 the previous year is 2.71 percent. 
The last five years upon issuance, more precisely 31.12.2001-31.12.2006 the DJ EuroStoxx 
50 has had an annual average return of 1.60 percent according to the prospect. The volatility 
used by Bøe is the average the last four years, since the five-year average is too high. The 
volatility is based on daily logarithmic return, and is 15.02 percent. 
4.5.2.1 Utility calculations 
The results of the utility calculations are summarized in Figure 27 below. All utilities are 
expressed in terms of certainty equivalent interest rates. 
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Figure 27 - Utility calculations of Orkla Finans Absolutt Europa II and the respective alternative investments 
The CR investment has a proportion of 100 percent in the risk-free asset, thus the certainty 
equivalent is equal to the risk-free return. The CF investment has a utility of 0.96 percent, 
whereas the structured product has a utility of 5.83 percent. The optimal allocation between 
risk-free and risky assets in the classical portfolios consists of 100 percent invested in the risk-
free asset.  
4.6 Fokus Bank Råvareindeksobligasjon olje 2007-2008 
4.6.1 Description of the product 
This AIO combines a zero-coupon bond issued at par value with one month futures on the 
WTI light sweet crude in USD. The investment period is 18 months, from 8 June 2007 to 8 
December 2008. The return of the product is linked to four scenarios. If the oil price has 
stayed in a range of 80-125 percent of the benchmark oil price from 8 June 2007 throughout 
the whole lifetime of the product, the return of the derivative is 21 percent. If has stayed 
between 75-135 percent the return is 14 percent. Further, if the return is in the range of 70-145 
percent at maturity the investor gain a seven percent return. Outside this range, the return of 
the structured product is the guaranteed element only.  
For investments between NOK100,000 and NOK900,000 the fees are two percent. Figure 28 
displays the payoff diagram of the structured product. 
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Figure 28 – Payoff diagram of Fokus Bank RIO olje 2007-2008 
4.6.2 Product specific parameters 
By combining the return of a three-year and five-year Norwegian governmental bond for the 
relevant period, we find the effective four-year risk-free rate of return. It is 4.93 percent. The 
annual volatility the last one and a half year upon issuance is 29.52 percent, according to 
Bøe’s estimations. In the prospect Focus refers to the five-year return upon issuance, which is 
132 percent, equivalent to an annual rate of 18.33 percent. I assume that there is no dividend 
paid on this index. This means that any convenience yield is ignored. 
4.6.3 Utility calculations 
The results of the utility calculations are summarized in Figure 29 below. All utilities are 
expressed in terms of certainty equivalent interest rates. 
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Figure 29 - Utility calculations of Fokus Bank RIO olje 2007-2008 and the respective alternative investments 
The utilities of the structured product, the CF investment and the CR investment are 0.86 
percent, 5.99 percent, and 7.32 percent respectively. The allocation of the Markowitz portfolio 
consists of 100 percent of the investment in risk-free asset. It is the CR investment that yields 
the highest utility. 
4.7 Acta Japansk Eiendom 2007-2010 
4.7.1 Description of the product 
This BMA product consists of a bank deposit and a call option on the Japanese real estate 
index Tokyo Stock Exchange REIT index. It runs from 20 March 2007 to 31 March 2010, i.e. 
the term is three years. The invested amount is guaranteed at maturity of the product.  
Fees are contingent on the size of the investment. For investments ranging from NOK50,000 
to NOK10,000,000, the fees are five percent of the invested amount. In accordance with the 
procedure for the other products, I assume that we are dealing with a small investor who could 
be safely placed within the range of NOK50,000 to NOK10,000,000.  
The ex post participation factor was 102% and this factor is being used in the calculations. 
Figure 30 illustrates the payoff diagram of the product. 
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Figure 30 – Payoff diagram of Acta Japansk Eiendom 2007-2010 
4.7.2 Product specific parameters 
The risk-free effective rate of return is estimated from the effective rate on a three-year 
Norwegian governmental bond for the relevant period. The rate is 4.54 percent. Three-year 
volatility on the Japanese real estate index Tokyo Stock Exchange REIT index is 13.82 
percent annually, calculated by Bøe. At the time of issue of the product, the REIT index had 
only existed for three years and ten months. According to the prospect of the structured 
product, Acta communicate that the price return of the REIT index has been 117.8 percent. 
This represents an annual return of 22.5 percent, excluding dividends. In the prospect Fokus 
further communicates that the annual dividend yield is 2.63 percent.  
4.7.3 Utility calculations 
The results of the utility calculations are summarized in Figure 31 below. All utilities are 
expressed in terms of certainty equivalent interest rates. 
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Figure 31 - Utility calculations of Acta Japansk Eiendom 2007-2010 and the respective alternative investments 
The structured product has a utility of 4.57 percent, which is marginal higher than the risk-
free rate of 4.54 percent. The utility of the CF is 15.68 percent whereas the CR investment has 
a utility of 19.95 percent. It is the CR investment that yields the highest utility. The optimal 
allocation between risk-free and risky assets in the classical portfolios consists of 100 percent 
invested in the risky assets. Studying the results, it is important to recall the discussion about 
the reliability of the datasets from section 4.1.4. 
4.8 DnB Nor Kraft 2007/2009 
4.8.1 Description of the product 
This AIO was issued by DnB Nor 29 January 2007 with expiration on 30 December 2009 
which means that time to maturity is two years. The potential return relates to the price 
development on three different fixed price contracts on electricity, listed on Nord Pool. More 
precisely, the product consists of three options with the electricity price in EUR per MWh as 
underlying. The three contracts are equally weighted. 
The participation is 105 percent, and the bond is issued at five percent above par value. The 
fees vary as usual according to the invested amount. For investments in the range of 
NOK10,000 to NOK1,490,000 they are three percent of the invested amount for normal 
customers. 
Figure 32 shows the payoff diagram of the product. 
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Figure 32 – Payoff diagram of DnB Nor Kraft 2007/2009 
4.8.2 Product specific parameters 
As before, the effective risk-free rate of return is estimated from the Norwegian governmental 
bond with the same term and issued for the same period as the structured product. The 
effective return on a three-year Norwegian governmental bond for the relevant period is 4.35 
percent. Three-year annual volatility is estimated by Bøe to 20.0 percent. There is no dividend 
on power price contracts. 
The underlying is forward contracts on power and not the spot price. Therefore it is the 
expected return on the forward contracts that is relevant. The prospect does not include any 
historical returns. However, in a prospect on a different structured product based on warrants 
on similar contracts provided by DnB Nor, the historical annual returns on two-year forward 
contracts from 2002-2004,2003-2005, and 2004-2006 constructed by one-year contracts, are 
on average 20.58 percent, 24.90 percent, and 30.92 percent annually. The overall average is 
25.47 percent annually.  
4.8.3 Utility calculations 
The results of the utility calculations are summarized in Figure 33 below. All utilities are 
expressed in terms of certainty equivalent interest rates. 
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Figure 33 - Utility calculations of DnB Nor Kraft 2007/2009 and the respective alternative investments 
The utility of the structured product is 5.71 percent, which is somewhat higher than the risk-
free return rate of 4.35 percent. It is the CR investment that yields the highest utility of 14.53 
percent, while the CF investment yields a utility of 13.04 percent. The optimal allocation 
between risk-free and risky assets in the classical portfolios consists of 100 percent invested 
in the risky assets. Again I emphasize that when studying the results, it is important to recall 
the discussion about the reliability of the datasets from section 4.1.4. 
4.9 Nordea Lock-in Basket 2006-2010 
4.9.1 Description of the product 
The product is an AIO and consists of a zero coupon bond and a call option linked to a basket 
of four underlying stock indices. The guaranteed amount to be paid back at maturity is 95 
percent of the invested amount. The four underlying stock indices are Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 
50, Tokyo Stock Price index, the Chinese Hang Seng index, and finally S&P BRIC 40 Euro 
index. They are weighted 40 percent, 30 percent, 15 percent, and 15 percent respectively.  
Additionally, the product includes a lock-in element. This means that if the return of the 
basket of the four indices increases by at least 20 percent any time during the product’s life, 
the investor is guaranteed at least these 20 percent. Consequently, the return will be minimum 
15 percent; 20 percent from the basket of indices, and minus five percent from the invested 
amount.  
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The product was issued on 3 November 2006 with expiration on 3 November 2010. This 
represents an investment period of four years. The fees are contingent on the size of the 
invested amount. For investments in the range of NOK10,000 to NOK990,000 the fees are 
four percent. The participation in the underlying is 100 percent. Figure 34 shows the payoff 
diagram of the product. 
 
Figure 34 – Payoff diagram of Nordea Lock-in Basket 2006-2010 
4.9.2 Product specific parameters 
The effective risk-free rate is found by combining the three-year and five-year Norwegian 
governmental bond for the relevant period. It is estimated to be 4.04 percent. Based on an 
average of the dividend yields employed on each index, the dividend yield for the basket of 
indices is 1.73 percent annually.  
4.9.3 Utility calculations 
The results of the utility calculations are summarized in Figure 35 below. All utilities are 
expressed in terms of certainty equivalent interest rates. 
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Figure 35 - Utility calculation of Nordea Lock-in Basket 2006-2010 
For this product I do not have data on the underlying assets. The utility of the structured 
product is 7.47 percent compared to the risk-free investment of 4.04 percent.  
4.10 Storebrand Spread Aksjeindeksobligasjon 2006-2010 
4.10.1 Description of the product 
This AIO product by Storebrand was issued on 29 August 2006 with expiration on 6 
September 2010. The term is four years. The return on the derivatives is linked to the 
difference between the return of Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 and the American index Russell 
2000. If the difference is positive, the return on the derivative is positive. Otherwise the return 
is zero on the derivatives, and the investor receives only the invested amount at maturity. The 
participation is 150 percent and the guaranteed amount is 100 percent of the initial 
investment. The product can deliver a positive return even if the markets falls during the 
period, contingent that DJES falls less than Russell 2000. 
As usual, the fees depend upon the invested amount. If the invested amount is in the range of 
NOK10,000 to NOK990,000 the fees are 4.25 percent of the invested amount for normal 
clients. Figure 36 represents the payoff diagram of the product. 
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Figure 36 - Payoff diagram of Storebrand spread 2006-2010 
The effective annual risk-free rate of return is as before estimated from the Norwegian 
governmental bond in the relevant period and with the same term as the structured product in 
question. The effective annual return on the four-year Norwegian governmental bond for the 
relevant period is found by combining a three-year and a five-year governmental bond. It is 
3.88 percent.  
4.10.2 Utility calculations 
The results of the utility calculations are summarized in Figure 37 below. All utilities are 
expressed in terms of certainty equivalent interest rates. 
 
Figure 37 - Utility calculation of Storebrand spread 2006-2010 
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For this product I do not have data on the underlying assets. The utility of the structured 
product is 6.45 percent compared to the risk-free investment of 3.88 percent.  
4.11 Discussion  
The results of my analysis are summarized in Table 4.2. The names of the financial 
institutions represent the structured product of that institution. I will use the names of the 
financial institutions to refer to the structured product of that institution throughout the 
discussion. 
 
Table 4.2 – Summary of findings 
We see that the utility from the adjusted classical investment, CF, is always inferior to the 
realistic classical investment, CR. This is as expected since the only difference between the 
two investments is that the CR investment is subject to no fees but receives dividends on the 
investment. Further, we see that the utility is higher from the structured product investments 
than from the CR investments for DnB Sektor and Orkla. For the rest of the products the 
situation is opposite.  
The utility of the structured product investments is for three products higher than the utility of 
the belonging CF investment, whereas for three other products the opposite is true. The utility 
of the structured product investments is superior to the risk-free investments for all products 
except the Fokus product.  
We notice that the CF and CR investments of the DnB Kraft and Acta have very high utilities 
compared to the other products. One reason for this could be the assumption related to the 
Product SP CF CR Rf
DnB Global 6,4 % 4,2 % 6,6 % 6,3 %
DnB Sektor 6,5 % 3,5 % 6,3 % 6,3 %
Orkla 5,8 % 1,0 % 4,5 % 4,5 %
Fokus 0,9 % 6,0 % 7,3 % 4,9 %
DnB Kraft 5,7 % 13,0 % 14,5 % 4,4 %
Acta 4,6 % 15,7 % 20,0 % 4,5 %
Nordea 7,5 % n/a n/a 4,0 %
Storebrand 6,4 % n/a n/a 3,9 %
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calculations of the underlying basket of assets. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the return 
distribution of the underlying basket of assets of these products, as well as four other 
products, has been calculated assuming normal distribution. The mean returns used to 
compute the normal distributions of these two products are taken from the respective 
prospects, where it is stated that Acta’s mean return is 22.5 percent whereas DnB Kraf’s mean 
return is 25.47 percent. These figures are definitely very high, and this could to a large extent 
explain the high utility from the CF and CR investments of these products. This is a strong 
argument for my choice not to base any quantitative conclusions on these products. 
4.11.1 The effect of free design 
To investigate the free design effect we compare the utility of the structured product 
investment to the utility of the adjusted classical investment, CF. The CF investment is subject 
to the same conditions as the structured product investment in terms of dividends and fees. 
Therefore, the difference in utility between the two investments could be directly compared 
and represents to what extent the investor appreciates access to a non-linear investment 
compared to a strictly linear investment. I refer to section 4.1.1 for a thorough explanation of 
the rationale behind the comparison. Table 4.3 summarizes the comparison. 
 
Table 4.3 – The difference between the structured product and the adjusted classical investment 
The table expresses the difference in utility, measured in certainty equivalent returns, between 
the structured product investment and the CF investment. We see that three of the products are 
yielding higher utilities than the CF investment, expressed by a positive number, whereas 
three of the products are yielding lower utilities than the CF investment, expressed by a 
negative number. This means that in three of the cases the free design increases the utility of 
Product SP/CF
Orkla 504,6 %
DnB Sektor 87,0 %
DnB Global 50,9 %
DnB Kraft -56,2 %
Acta -70,8 %
Fokus -85,7 %
Nordea n/a
Storebrand n/a
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the investors, whereas in three other cases it reduces the utility. For two of the products I do 
not have data. They are presented alphabetically. 
Regarding the Fokus product it is interesting to notice that this is the product that performs the 
poorest in terms of expected return (Bøe, 2007). It has an expected annual return which is 1.7 
percent below the risk-free rate. This explains, at least partially, the highly negative 
percentage of the product.  
We should be careful to conclude upon the percentages of all the products. In the lack of 
simulated probability distribution of the returns of the underlying assets of six of the eight 
products, their distributions are estimated based on normal distribution. This strongly limits 
the reliability of the results. I refer to section 4.1.4 for a closer discussion about the quality of 
the datasets. 
However, for DnB Global and DnB Sektor we have simulated distributions for both the 
structured products and the underlying assets. We can therefore draw conclusions upon these 
two products without having a reliability issue. The downside is that we are reducing the size 
of the sample and therefore the sample’s representativeness for structured products in Norway 
as a whole. However, we have seen that the two products in questions are considered to be 
representative for the Norwegian market. The pros and the cons could therefore be said to 
neutralize. 
Limiting the analysis to include only DnB Global and DnB Sektor we can conclude that 
enhancing investment opportunities from strictly linear classical investments to structured 
product investments offering non-linear combinations of the risk-free asset and the risky 
assets does increases the investors’ utility in the range of 51 to 87 percent.  
4.11.2 Structured product investments compared to the alternative investments 
To investigate how structured products perform compared to the alternative investments I 
look at the difference between the utility of the structured product investments and the two 
alternative investments; the CR investment and the risk-free investment. The results are 
summarized in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.4 – The differences between the structured product and the two alternative investments 
4.11.2.1 Structured product investment versus classical CR investment 
Let us first compare the structured product investment to the CR investment. We see that for 
two of the products the percentages are positive. This means that the investment in the 
structured product has a superior utility than the CR investment. Four of the eight products 
have negative percentages, meaning the CR investment yields a higher utility than the 
structured product.  
Again we should be careful about concluding based upon the results from all the product 
comparisons due to the reliability of the datasets. However, we can conclude upon the 
findings from DnB Global and DnB Sektor which are representative for the Norwegian 
market of structured products. We see that DnB Sektor yields 3.7 percent higher utility than 
the CR investment, whereas DnB Global yields 3.6 percent lower utility than the CR 
investment. We roughly conclude that structured products provide about the same utility as 
the CR investment.  
From the findings we can conclude that it seems like the structured product investments are 
no worse than the CR investment. Looking deeper into the assumptions of my calculations we 
can find arguments that speak in favor of this conclusion.  
One of the assumptions of the CR investment alternative is that the investor has direct access 
to the underlying assets involved in the structured products. This is a strong assumption. In 
chapter two I argue that one of the advantages of structured products is indeed that they gives 
small private investors access to markets and securities they otherwise would not have access 
to. The Japanese REIT index embedded in the structured product from Acta is an example of 
Product SP/CR SP/Rf
Orkla 29,7 % 29,7 %
DnB Sektor 3,7 % 3,7 %
DnB Global -3,6 % 1,7 %
DnB Kraft -60,7 % 31,3 %
Acta -77,1 % 0,7 %
Fokus -88,3 % -82,6 %
Nordea n/a 84,9 %
Storebrand n/a 66,1 %
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a security that a small, private investor in Norway most likely would not have access to 
without the structured product. For this superior access to markets and securities it is 
reasonable to assume that the small private investor is willing to pay a premium. 
It is also highly relevant to question whether a small, private investor has the required 
knowledge to understand these markets and conclude that he wants to invest in the relevant 
indices. In chapter two I argue that they have inferior knowledge compared to the financial 
institutions. It is therefore likely to assume that the investor is willing to pay a premium for 
having an investment proposal ready on the table, prepared by the bank. 
These two effects are difficult to quantify but it is likely to assume that they would improve 
the position of structured products compared to CR. This qualitative conclusion supports the 
quantitative conclusion that it is likely to say that structured product investments are not 
worse than the CR investments. 
4.11.2.2 Structured product investment versus risk-free investment 
Let us now compare the utility of the structured product investment to the utility of the risk-
free investment. From Table 4.4 we see that all the structured products, with the exception of 
one, yield utilities that are higher than the risk-free rate. The exception is the product by 
Fokus. One reason for this could be the exceptional low expected return from the product. 
When comparing the structured products to the risk-free return, I use only the return 
distribution of the structured products. I have such distributions for all the eight products of 
my sample. The difference of the utility measured in certainty equivalents of the average 
product to the average risk-free investment is 17 percent. This means that structured products 
yield on average a utility that is 17 percent higher than the utility of a bank deposit. From my 
findings I can therefore conclude that structured products are better investments in terms of 
utility than bank deposits. 
4.11.2.3 Structured products versus alternative investments, conclusion 
I have assumed that when comparing investments in structured product to investments in a 
risk-free asset the investors have no knowledge or experience from financial markets. Without 
the alternative of a structured product investment they face only one investment possibility; 
the risk-free asset, also known as the bank deposit. For these investors we see that structured 
products deliver increased utility in the range of 17 percent. When comparing a structured 
product investment to a CR investment, I have assumed that the investor has knowledge about 
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or is familiar to market investments and has invested in stock markets before. I conclude that 
utility of the structured product investment and the CR investment is about the same for the 
two investments.  
4.11.3 Changing the input parameters and assumptions 
In my findings so far I have only used classical PT-parameters found by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992). Moreover, I have based my calculations on several assumptions presented 
in section 4.2. Obviously, changing the parameters and assumptions would affect the results 
of my analysis. In this section I will investigate how the utilities of the structured products and 
the alternative classical investments change when I change the input parameters and 
assumptions. 
First I will look at the effect of changing the prospect theory parameters from the K-T 
parameters to the parameters of a Norwegian investor. Thereafter I will investigate the effect 
of changing the reference point from equaling the risk-free rate of return to zero. Finally I will 
analyze the effect of changing the probability perception parameter, γ, from 0.65 to 1.0. The 
latter change is related to the discussion on the rationality of the prospect theory in section 
3.4.3.  
4.11.3.1 Introducing the Norwegian investor 
To compare the results of classical PT-parameters, labeled K-T, with the results of Norwegian 
PT-parameters, labeled Norwegian, I use the parameters found in the INTRA survey, 
presented in section 3.6.3. I investigate the two products with the most reliable dataset, 
namely DnB Global and DnB Sektor. I also compare the utility of the structured product 
investments to the risk-free investment. This is done on all the products in my sample since I 
have reliable data on all the probability distributions of the structured products. 
The comparison between the Norwegian and the K-T investor is summarized in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5 – The differences in utility between the structured product and the alternative investments for the 
Norwegian investor and the K-T investor 
Looking at the utility of the structured product compared to the utility of the risk-free 
investment, we see that all the utilities with the exception of one increase when using 
Norwegian prospect theory parameters compared to K-T parameters. This means that the 
utility of the structured products has increased. The difference in utility between the 
structured product investments and the risk-free investments is on average 34 percent for the 
Norwegian investor, compared to 17 percent for the K-T investor, as we saw in the previous 
section.  
Comparing the free design effect of the Norwegian investor to the K-T investor, we see that 
the effect on the Norwegian investor on average is less than half the effect of the K-T investor 
for the DnB Global and the DnB Sektor products.  
Investigating the utility of the structured product investments compared to the utility of CR 
investments for the DnB Global and DnB Sektor products, we notice that the performance of 
the structured products is poorer when applying Norwegian prospect theory parameters 
instead of classical K-T parameters. In difference to the K-T investor, we can say that the 
Norwegian investor clearly prefers the structured product investment to the CR investment. 
We can conclude that the structured product investments clearly generate lower utility than 
the CR investments when applying Norwegian prospect theory parameters compared to K-T 
parameters, and that the free design effect is reduce by more than 50 percent on average. 
However, the difference in utility of the structured product investments compared to the risk-
free investments has doubled from 17 percent to 34 percent as a consequence of introducing 
Product SP/Rf SP/CF SP/CR
Norwegian K-T Norwegian K-T Norwegian K-T
DnB Global 19,9 % 1,7 % 27,2 % 50,9 % -9,4 % -3,6 %
DnB Sektor 23,2 % 3,7 % 36,9 % 87,0 % -8,4 % 3,7 %
Orkla 36,3 % 29,7 %
Fokus -20,5 % -82,6 %
DnB Kraft 41,2 % 31,3 %
Acta 17,0 % 0,7 %
Nordea 78,6 % 84,9 %
Storebrand 76,4 % 66,1 %
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Norwegian prospect theory parameters. This means that the utility of the structured products 
has increased. 
In chapter five I adapt the prospect theory parameters to a Norwegian investor and a Swiss 
investor.  
4.11.3.2 Introducing the reference point equal to zero 
So far I have assumed that the reference point is equal to the risk-free rate. However, many 
private investors have a reference point equal to zero. When the reference point of the 
investor is zero the structured products with a 100 percent capital protection cannot yield 
negative utility if we exclude the fees. Hence, intuitively one should expect that the utility of 
the structured products is higher with the new reference point. The same intuitive expectation 
is valid for the realistic classical investment, CR, because the possibility of returns below the 
reference point is lower since there is lower probability for return below zero than below the 
risk-free rate.  
Table 4.6 shows the utility of the structured products for reference point equal to zero and 
reference point equal to the risk-free rate.  
 
Table 4.6 – Utilities of structured products when the reference point is equal to zero compared to reference point 
equal to the risk-free rate of return 
As expected, we see that all the structured products have a higher utility when the reference 
point equals zero compared to when the reference point equals risk-free rate of return. The 
average utility of the products has increased by 32 percent. This also means that they have 
improved their position with respect to the risk-free investment. 
Product SP (RP=0) SP (RP=Rf)
DnB Global 8,4 % 6,4 %
DnB Sektor 8,7 % 6,5 %
Orkla 7,2 % 5,8 %
Fokus 3,0 % 0,9 %
DnB Kraft 7,5 % 5,7 %
Acta 6,2 % 4,6 %
Nordea 8,4 % 7,5 %
Storebrand 8,4 % 6,4 %
Average 7,2 % 5,5 %
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Next, we compare the utility of the CR investment for the two different reference points. The 
results are summarized in Table 4.7. I use the DnB Global and DnB Sektor since I have the 
highest quality datasets on the underlying of these products. 
 
Table 4.7 - Utilities of the CR investments when the reference point is equal to zero and the risk-free rate of return 
We see that the realistic classical investment on average increases its utility by close to 25 
percent when introducing reference point equal to zero compared to the standard situation in 
which the reference point is equal to risk-free rate.  
Finally we look at the difference in free design effects when using two different reference 
points. The results are summarized in Table 4.8. 
 
Table 4.8 – The free design effect of the structured products for reference points equal to zero and to the risk-free rate 
of return 
The free design effect is on average about 17 percent lower when the reference point is zero 
compared to when the reference point is equal to the risk-free rate of return.  
To summarize the effects of changing the reference point from being the risk-free rate to 
being zero, we can say that the average utility of the structured products increases by 32 
percent, which means that they strengthen their position with respect to the risk-free 
investment. Further, the utility of the classical realistic investment increases on average by 25 
percent. The free design effect is on average 17 percent lower.  
For the investor with a reference point which is zero instead of equal to the risk-free return, 
we can conclude that the structured products improve their position compared to the risk-free 
investment and compared to the optimal classical realistic investment. The fact that both the 
Product CR (RP=0) CR (RP=Rf)
DnB Global 8,3 % 6,6 %
DnB Sektor 7,9 % 6,3 %
Average 8,1 % 6,5 %
Product SP/CF (RP=0) SP/CF (RP=Rf)
DnB Global 42,2 % 50,9 %
DnB Sektor 72,0 % 87,0 %
Average 57,1 % 68,9 %
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classical investments experience increased utility is in line with what we assumed. However, 
the free design effect is smaller. This is interesting because it means that investors with a 
reference point equal to the risk-free return appreciate the availability of structured products 
more than those with a reference point which is zero.  
4.11.3.3 Making the model rational 
As we saw in chapter three, section 3.4.3, classical finance theory argues that behavioral 
theories such as prospect theory are irrational. We further saw that the criticism is not 
necessarily fair because the majority of aspects of prospect theory could be explained by 
rationality. Indeed, the only irrational element of prospect theory is probability weighting.  
Until now we have strictly looked at the utilities of structured products compared to classical 
investments for an irrational investor. We have used the K-T prospect theory parameters 
which give γ, the parameter reflecting the bias in perception of probabilities, the value of 0.65. 
To find the utilities of the structured products and the classical investments of a rational 
investor, we equal the γ-parameter to one. We will see that this introduction of a rational 
investor completely changes the results of the analysis so far.  
First we investigate how the utility of the structured products changes when we introduce the 
rational investor. Table 4.9 shows the utilities of the structured products for the rational 
investor with γ equal to one, and for the K-T investor which is irrational and has γ equal to 
0.65.  
 
Table 4.9 - Utilities of the structured products for γ equal to one and γ equal to 0.65 
Product SP (γ=1) SP (γ=0.65)
Orkla 4,1 % 5,8 %
DnB Sektor 3,4 % 6,5 %
DnB Global 4,4 % 6,4 %
DnB Kraft 1,2 % 5,7 %
Acta 1,6 % 4,6 %
Fokus -1,8 % 0,9 %
Nordea 4,3 % 7,5 %
Storebrand -0,3 % 6,4 %
Average 2,1 % 5,5 %
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We can see that all the structured products yield lower utility when the investor is rational, 
and that two of the products yield a negative utility. The average utility of the structured 
products measured in certainty equivalents drops by 3.4 percent, which could be translated 
into a 61.5 percent decrease in utility. This means that the rational investor appreciates the 
structured product less than half as much as the irrational investor.  
Next, we look at the utility of the structured product investments compared to the risk-free 
investments for the rational investor. The comparison is shown in Table 4.10. 
 
Table 4.10 – Utilities of the structured products for γ equal to one compared to the risk-free rate of return 
We can see that all products except one have lower utility measured in certainty equivalents 
than the risk-free rate of return. The exception is the Nordea product which has a slightly 
higher utility than the risk-free investment. On average the utility of the structured products 
for the rational investor is 57 percent lower than the utility of the bank deposit. 
Finally, we compare the rational investor’s utility of the structured products with the utility of 
the CR investment, and we look at the free design effect. The results are presented in Table 
4.11. 
Product SP (γ=1) Rf
Orkla 4,1 % 4,5 %
DnB Sektor 3,4 % 6,3 %
DnB Global 4,4 % 6,3 %
DnB Kraft 1,2 % 4,4 %
Acta 1,6 % 4,5 %
Fokus -1,8 % 4,9 %
Nordea 4,3 % 4,0 %
Storebrand -0,3 % 3,9 %
Average 2,1 % 4,9 %
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Table 4.11 – Utilities of the structured product and the classical investments for γ equal to one 
We see that the utility of the structured products for the rational investor on average is 41 
percent lower than the utility of the CR investment. We also see that the free design effect is 
negative.  
To conclude we can say that when we adapt the K-T prospect theory parameters to a rational 
investor, the utilities of the structured products compared to the classical investments fall 
dramatically, and the free design effect vanishes. Roughly speaking we can say that the 
utilities of the structured products are less than half the utilities of the alternative classical 
investments. The effect of introducing a rational investor compared to an irrational investor 
reduces the average utility of the structured products by more than 60 percent. 
4.11.4 Was it right to ban structured products in Norway? 
The ultimate question to be answered in this chapter was whether it was a wise decision to 
practically ban structured products in Norway.  
The base case of the analysis has been an irrational investor. The irrationality has been 
reflected through a biased perception of probabilities, expressed by γ equal to 0.65. We have 
seen that the investors having the risk-free investment as their alternative investment had 17 
percent higher utility from the structured products, whereas the investors having the CR 
investment as their alternative were roughly indifferent between structured products and the 
CR investments. The free design effect was between 51 and 87 percent. In general structured 
products appeared to be quite good investments. At least we could not conclude that they 
were bad investments. 
However, the results changed dramatically when we modified the assumptions and the 
parameters. When applying Norwegian prospect theory parameters the utility of the structured 
products increased and the CR investment clearly generated lower utility than the structured 
product investment. However, the free design effect halved. By applying a reference point 
equal to zero instead of the risk-free rate the structured products yielded higher utility and 
Product SP CF CR Rf
DnB Global 4,4 % 4,5 % 6,9 % 6,3 %
DnB Sektor 3,4 % 3,5 % 6,3 % 6,3 %
Average 3,9 % 4,0 % 6,6 % 6,3 %
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strengthened their position with respect to the classical investments. However, also here the 
free design effect was reduced compared to when the K-T prospect theory parameters were 
applied. 
The most radical change in the results happened when we assumed that the investor was 
rational, meaning that he is not subject to any bias in the perception of probabilities. The 
utility of the structured products was reduced by more than 60 percent compared to the 
irrational investor. Moreover, both the classical investments yielded by far higher utility than 
the structured products, and the free design effect was gone. Roughly speaking the classical 
investments were both twice as good in terms of utility than the structured product 
investments. 
We can conclude that the preferences of the irrational investor and the rational investor tend 
to be completely different. Whereas irrational investors generally preferred structured 
products to the classical investments, and profited from a strong free design effect, rational 
investors preferred the classical investments by large, and did not have any free design effect 
from structured products.  
Based upon this, we can further conclude that investments in the structured products analyzed 
in this thesis are irrational. I have argued that my sample is representative for the Norwegian 
market for structured products. Hence, we can conclude that investments in Norwegian 
structured products can only be good investments if the investor is irrational. However, the 
banks, in role of financial advisors, should not accept this irrationality of the client. Instead 
they should help the client to make rational choices, meaning they should correct the client’s 
biased probability perception.  
Was it correct to practically ban structured products from the Norwegian market? Based on 
my findings the answer is yes. What we have seen is that Norwegian banks instead of 
correcting the client’s bias have been aggressively selling the structured products to their 
clients. This means that the banks have been profiting from their clients’ irrationality, which 
is a weakness of the clients, to sell structured products which are profitable for the banks. I 
believe this could be compared to selling drugs to drug addicts! Although this metaphor is 
harsh, I believe it could be a descriptive picture of the banks’ behavior. 
4.11.5 Personal reflections 
At the end of this chapter I find room for some personal reflections based upon my findings. 
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4.11.5.1 A comment on the CR investment 
Implicitly, for the CR investment alternative, I have assumed that a small, private investor 
with knowledge about financial markets can access all the assets or securities that are 
underlying assets of the structured product. But is this realistic? Would it be possible for the 
investor to obtain the underlying basket of assets in the markets? If we assume that the 
investor is a small, private investor, the most likely answer is no. By consequence, we would 
have to adjust the real-life classical model and find a proxy.  
As the world markets globalize it is natural to expect increased investment possibilities, which 
converge the number of securities available to the small private investor towards the global 
population of securities. In such a scenario my original assumptions are valid. However, in 
today’s markets, that is not necessarily the case.  
4.11.5.2 A comment on the Røeggen case in light of the utility analysis of the involved 
products  
In chapter two, section 2.2.3, I mention the Røeggen case. In light of the findings in this 
chapter it could be interesting to give a comment on the case. 
Mr Røeggen invested in two structured products sold by DnB Nor; DnB Global and DnB 
Sektor. Assuming Røeggen wanted to do good rational investments, the investment in the two 
products offered by DnB Nor was a bad choice. Table 4.11 presented earlier in this chapter 
summarizes the utility calculations of the two structured products and the classical 
investments. 
Røeggen achieved less utility from the structured products than what he could have achieved 
from the two classical investment alternatives. Also, he had no free design effect to profit 
from. Mr Røeggen would have been much better off by investing in the classical alternatives. 
Assuming that he had no experience or knowledge about market investments, his alternative 
would have been to do the risk-free investment, in other words investing in his savings 
account. He would on average have achieved a 65 percent higher utility from this alternative 
than from investing in the structured products.  
In other words, according to my analysis his investment decision could only be irrational. It is 
hard to understand how DnB Nor could advice him to invest in the products.  
Røeggen sued the bank for advising him to invest in the products. The verdict in the case fell 
from the city court of Oslo Monday 15 June 2010. DnB Nor was judged guilty of providing 
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too poor information about the products and sentenced to compensate Mr. Røeggen (Bache & 
Stranden, 2010). 
It is expected that the final verdict will fall in the Supreme Court.  
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5 Cultural background and its influence on 
investment choices 
In chapter four we have seen that introducing other prospect theory parameters changes the 
utility of structured products. Since different prospect theory parameters return different 
utilities of the strcutured products, it seems that investors with different cultural backgrounds 
have different investment preferences. An interesting question is to what extent I can prove 
this relationship between cultural backgrounds and investment behavior based upon utility 
calculations on my sample of structured products. 
In this chapter I will inestigate this question. I will look at how the structured products 
presented in chapter four are appreciated by a Norwegian investor and a Swiss investor, 
compared to the K-T investor applied in the previous chapter. Then I will calculate the free 
design effect for the Swiss and the Norwegian investor. By free design effect I refer to the 
increase in utility from the investment in the structured product compared to the adjusted 
classical investment.  
5.1 Assumptions and parameters 
I assume that cultural backgrounds are dependent solely on the country to which the investor 
belongs. This means that a Swiss investor represents the Swiss culture whereas a Norwegian 
investor represents the Norwegian culture.  
In all the utility calculations in this chapter I use the normalized prospect theory with K-T 
probability weighting function and the piecewise power value function. I further assume that 
the Swiss investor has the same reference point as the Norwegian investor, in this chapter the 
risk-free rate of return. 
I will use the prospect theory parameters for Norway and Switzerland found in the INTRA 
survey, and presented in chapter three.  
5.2 Utility analysis 
Based upon the assumptions and parameters presented above, I conduct the utility analysis in 
three steps. First I compare the Norwegian investor to the K-T investor. Second I compare the 
Swiss investor to the K-T investor. Third, I compare the Norwegian to the Swiss investor. The 
K-T investor can be regarded as the non-culturized investor. 
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5.2.1 Norwegian investor versus K-T investor 
By comparing the utility score of the structured products found by classical K-T prospect 
theory parameters to the score found by Norwegian parameters, we can see how the 
Norwegian culture affects the utility compared to the non-culturized utility. Referring to the 
classical K-T prospect theory parameters, I will say the K-T investor, while referring to the 
Norwegian parameters I will say the Norwegian investor. Table 5.1 summarizes the 
comparison. 
 
Table 5.1 – Comparison of structured product utilities between the K-T and the Norwegian investor 
We see that for all products except one the Norwegian investor scores higher than the K-T 
investor. Fokus’ product is subject to the largest utility improvement with a magnitude of 356 
percent. In the other end of the scale, Nordea’s product is suffering from the change in 
parameters, and the utility for the Norwegian investor is three percent lower than for the K-T 
investor. The median improvement is 12 percent. We can conclude that the Norwegian 
investor realizes about 12 percent higher utility from the structured products than the non-
culturized investor. 
5.2.2 Swiss investor versus K-T investor 
Comparing the K-T parameters with the Swiss parameters shows how the Swiss investor 
evaluates the structured products compared to the non-culturized investor. The results are 
summarized in Table 5.2. 
Product K-T Norwegian ΔU
Acta 4,57 % 5,31 % 16 %
DnB Kraft 5,71 % 6,14 % 8 %
DnB Global 6,41 % 7,55 % 18 %
DnB Sektor 6,53 % 7,76 % 19 %
Fokus 0,86 % 3,92 % 356 %
Nordea 7,47 % 7,22 % -3 %
Orkla 5,83 % 6,12 % 5 %
Storebrand 6,45 % 6,85 % 6 %
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Table 5.2 - Comparison of structured product utilities between the K-T and the Swiss investor 
From five out of eight products the Swiss investor achieves lower utility than the K-T 
investor. Again, Fokus’ product is subject to the largest utility improvement with a magnitude 
of 322 percent. The median improvement is minus ten percent. We conclude that the Swiss 
investor overall achieves ten percent less utility from the structured products than the non-
culturized K-T investor. 
5.2.3 Norwegian investor versus Swiss investor 
We have investigated how the utility of the structured products changes as we look at the 
investments from a Norwegian point of view compared to the K-T perspective, and a Swiss 
viewpoint to the K-T perspective. However, it is interesting to compare the Norwegian 
investor to the Swiss investor directly. This comparison is summarized in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3 - Comparison of structured product utilities between the Norwegian and the Swiss investor 
Product K-T Swiss ΔU
Acta 4,57 % 4,23 % -8 %
DnB Kraft 5,71 % 4,77 % -17 %
DnB Global 6,41 % 6,48 % 1 %
DnB Sektor 6,53 % 6,56 % 0 %
Fokus 0,86 % 3,62 % 322 %
Nordea 7,47 % 6,20 % -17 %
Orkla 5,83 % 5,14 % -12 %
Storebrand 6,45 % 5,26 % -18 %
Product Norwegian Swiss ΔU
Acta 5,31 % 4,23 % -20 %
DnB Kraft 6,14 % 4,77 % -22 %
DnB Global 7,55 % 6,48 % -14 %
DnB Sektor 7,76 % 6,56 % -16 %
Fokus 3,92 % 3,62 % -8 %
Nordea 7,22 % 6,20 % -14 %
Orkla 6,12 % 5,14 % -16 %
Storebrand 6,85 % 5,26 % -23 %
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For all the products the Swiss investor has a lower utility than the Norwegian investor. The 
difference is in the magnitude of eight to 23 percent. The Storebrand product has the biggest 
difference, whereas the Fokus product has the smallest difference. The median difference is 
16 percent. We conclude that a Swiss investor generally has 16 percent lower utility from the 
structured products in my sample than the Norwegian investor. 
5.3 Discussion 
I start by discussing the difference in utility between a Norwegian and a Swiss investor. 
Thereafter I discuss the link between the cultural background of the investors and their 
investment preferences. 
5.3.1 The difference between the Norwegian and Swiss investor 
From the numerical analysis we have seen that the Swiss and the Norwegian investors realize 
different utilities from the structured products. The Norwegian investor has on average higher 
utility from the structured products than the K-T investor, whereas the Swiss investor has 
lower average utility from the products than the K-T investor. In numbers the Norwegian 
investor realizes 12 percent higher utility from the structured products than the K-T investor, 
whereas the Swiss investor realizes ten percent lower utility.  
There is no surprise that the utility changes when we change the parameters of the prospect 
theory model. However, what at first glance seems surprising is that the Swiss investor has 16 
percent less utility from the structured products than his Norwegian colleague. This is despite 
the fact that the Swiss investor is twice as loss averse as his Norwegian colleague. 
However, if we study the numbers more carefully, the results are not that surprising. We have 
throughout this chapter assumed that the prospect theory investor has the risk-free investment 
as his reference point. This means that any return below the risk-free rate is achieved as a loss 
by the investor. Recalling that the structured products have capital protection at zero percent 
return, we see that the investor can have a negative utility from the products even though they 
are capital protection products. Indeed, any return between zero and the risk-free rate 
represents a negative utility to the investor. 
The Swiss investor has a loss aversion which is more than twice the Norwegian investor’s loss 
aversion. In other words, when the return of the structured products is between the reference 
point and zero, the Swiss investor’s utility suffers twice as much as the Norwegian investor’s 
utility. Let us look closer at the probability of returns between zero and the risk-free rate. I 
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look at the DnB Global and the DnB Sektor structured product. I choose these two products 
because they have the most reliable datasets.  
The probability of returns between zero and the reference point, which is 6.3 percent for the 
two products, is 48.2 percent for DnB Global and 53.9 percent for DnB Sektor.  It is in other 
words as probable that the utility from the products will be positive as negative, meaning that 
the degree of loss aversion is highly determinant for the utility of the products. Therefore 
there is no surprise that the Swiss investor has lower utility from the structured products.  
We can quantify the loss aversion’s effect on the difference in utility between the two 
investors for the two products. For DnB Global the loss aversion can explain a difference in 
certainty equivalents of 1.26 percent, whereas for DnB Sektor it explains a difference in 
certainty equivalents of 1.36 percent.  
Notice that from Table 5.3 we see that the differences between the products in terms of 
certainty equivalents are 1.07 percent for DnB Global and 1.20 percent for DnB Sektor. The 
effect of the differences in loss aversion is therefore higher than the utility difference between 
the products. This could be explained by the fact that we have only looked at the loss aversion 
effect in this section. In reality, the difference in risk aversion for losses does also play. 
However I do not investigate this effect. 
Since all the products I investigate are capital protection products, it is reasonable to say that 
the abovementioned effect could be attributed to all the products in my sample. I therefore 
conclude that the difference between the utilities of the two investors could to a large extent 
be explained by the difference in loss aversion between the Norwegian and Swiss investors. 
The effect is amplified by a high probability of a negative utility from the products, because 
the capital protection level of the products level is below the reference point. 
5.3.2 Cultural dimensions and investment behavior 
The key question to be answered in this chapter was to what extent my findings from the 
analysis of the structured products could prove a relationship between cultural background 
and investment behavior. 
If such a relationship exists, it should be reflected by a difference in the free design effect for 
investors with different cultural backgrounds. We recall that the free design effect refers to the 
increase in utility from an investment in a structured product compared to an adjusted 
classical investment.  
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From Hofstede’s cultural dimensions we have seen that the Swiss investor is more uncertainty 
avoidant than the Norwegian investor. The more uncertainty avoiding an investor is, the more 
he prefers the predictable to the unpredictable.  
Structured products have a customized payoff structure. All the products of my sample, which 
is representative for the Norwegian market, are capital protection products. For these products 
the predicatability is increased because all return combinations of the underlying assets that 
yield a negative return are eliminated. Therefore, the structured products in my sample are 
more predictable than a classical investment in the same assets. Hence, the higher uncertainty 
avoidance of the Swiss investor compared to the Norwegian investor should be reflected 
through a stronger free design effect.  
Table 5.4 shows the comparison of the utilities between the Norwegian and the Swiss investor 
of the CF investments for DnB Global and DnB Sektor of the Norwegian and Swiss investor. 
Again I choose to look at these two products because they have the most reliable datasets. 
 
Table 5.4 – Utility comparison of the CF investment between a Norwegian and a Swiss investor 
The Swiss investor has on average 25.1 percent lower utility from the investment than the 
Norwegian investor. Next, I have to compare the difference in utilities of the investors when 
they invest in the structured products. This comparison is summarized in Table 5.5. 
 
Table 5.5 – Differences in utility from the structured products between a Norwegian and a Swiss investor 
We see that the difference in utility between the investors falls from 25.1 percent to 14.9 
percent when they invest in the structured products compared to a linear portfolio investment. 
The Swiss investor has a larger relative increase in utility compared to the Norwegian 
CF Nor Swiss ΔU
Global 5,94 % 4,61 % -22,43 %
Sektor 5,67 % 4,09 % -27,76 %
Average 5,80 % 4,35 % -25,10 %
SP Nor Swiss Swiss/Nor
Global 7,55 % 6,48 % -14,27 %
Sektor 7,76 % 6,56 % -15,50 %
Average 7,66 % 6,52 % -14,88 %
98 
 
investor. This speaks in favor of the fact that the Swiss investor benefits the most from 
structured products.  
Table 5.6 compares the free design effect for both investors from each product. If the Swiss 
investor benefits the most from structured products, as suggested above, one should expect to 
see that the Swiss investor has the biggest magnitude of change from the linear investments to 
the non-linear investments. In other words, the Swiss investor should be the one that 
appreciates the most the free design effect from access to structured products. 
 
Table 5.6 – The free design effect for the Norwegian and the Swiss investor 
From the table this is exactly what we see. The Swiss investor has 57,13 percent higher 
increase in the average utility compared to the Norwegian investor when comparing the utility 
change from an investment in a structured product to a classical investment. This strengthens 
the conclusion that the Swiss investor, which is the most uncertainty avoidant, benefits the 
most from having access to structured products.  
We can conclude that my findings from the investigation of two structured products support 
quantitatively the relation between the cultural background of the investor and his investment 
behavior and preferences.  
5.3.3 Personal reflections 
Broadening the scope of the discussion, the relation between culture and investment behavior 
represents a challenge for the manufacturers of structured products as the world globalizes. A 
successful product on the Swiss market could be an unpopular product on the Norwegian 
market. To make optimal products, the producers must study the different countries in which 
they want to distribute their products. In other words, products must be customized to fit to a 
certain culture. This limits the potential economies of scales that could be achieved from 
globalization of structured products, and the banks must realize this.  
There is also another interesting aspect of the globalization. As cultures interact and blend 
into each other, the cultural dimensions of Hofstede could be assumed to be less predictive. 
Nor Swiss Diff
Global 27,20 % 40,58 % 49,22%
Sektor 36,91 % 60,15 % 62,95%
Average 32,06 % 50,37 % 57,13%
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For instance, the Norwegian culture is in a continuous evolution which increases in magnitude 
with the globalization. To make the most popular structured products the manufacturers must 
go beyond the assumption that cultures are linked to countries, and investigate sub-cultures. 
This would make the design process of structured products more difficult and costly. Indeed, 
to the extreme the products must be customized for each and every single investor since. It is 
hard to imagine that this would ever be the case. Therefore some level of stereotyping is 
necessary. However, the dangers of stereotyping mentioned towards the end of chapter three 
must be kept in mind throughout the designing process. 
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6 Conclusions and final comments 
6.1 Conclusions 
Throughout the 2000s the criticism of stuctured products in Norway amplified. Regulations 
became increasingly stricter, and in 2008 structured products were practically banned from 
the Norwegian market.  
In this master thesis I have analyzed a representative sample of structured products from the 
Norwegian market. The main research aim has been to evaluate whether the banning was a 
sound decision.  
In chapter four I have performed prospect theory utility calculations of the structured products 
in my sample and compared the results to utilities of alternative investments. I have conducted 
the utility calculations based upon classical K-T prospect theory parameters, and a reference 
point equal to the risk-free rate of return. Thereafter I have changed the parameters to see how 
this affected the results of the analysis. 
Structured products represent non-linear investments. What are the best alternative 
investments depend upon the investor. I have looked at small, private investors who have 
historically been the typical investors in structured products in Norway. Depended upon their 
knowledge about and access to financial markets their best alternative investment is either to 
invest in an optimal linear portfolio consisting of the same assets as the structured product or 
to invest in a risk-free asset, represented by a bank deposit. 
The base case of the analysis involves a classical K-T investor, who is an irrational investor. 
We have seen that the investors having the risk-free investment as their alternative investment 
had 17 percent higher utility from the structured products, whereas the investors having the 
CR investment as their alternative were roughly indifferent between structured products and 
the CR investments. The effect from free design was between 51 and 87 percent. From this we 
can conclude that in general structured products appear to be quite good investments for the 
irrational investor. At least we cannot conclude that they are bad investments. 
Changing the assumptions and parameters, the story is different. The most radical change in 
the results happens when we assume that the investor is rational. We have seen that the utility 
of the structured products was reduced by more than 60 percent compared to the irrational 
investor, that there were no free design effects, and that both the CR investment and the risk-
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free investment yielded twice as high utility compared to the structured products. From this 
we can conclude that structured product investments are bad investments for rational 
investors. 
Investments in the structured products analyzed are bad for rational investors. Such 
investments can only be considered good if the investor is irrational. The banks in the role of 
financial advisors should advise the client to make rational choices. Contrarily, what we have 
seen in Norway is that banks have been profiting from their clients’ irrationality by selling 
structured products which are profitable for the banks, but bad for the clients. I believe this 
could be compared to selling drugs to drug addicts! Although this metaphor is harsh, I believe 
it draws a descriptive picture of the banks’ behavior. Ultimately, I therefore conclude that it 
was a sound decision to practically ban structured products from the Norwegian market. 
In the second part of this thesis I have looked into the link between culture and investments. 
The aim was to investigate how cultural dimensions can influence investment choices. In 
chapter five I have used my utility estimations of the structured products in my sample to 
investigate this potential link between cultural dimensions and investment choices and 
behavior. I have looked at how the difference in uncertainty avoidance between two countries 
is reflected through the utility gain achieved from having access to structured products.  
I conclude that a Swiss investor has about 57 percent greater utility from the access to 
structured products than a Norwegian investor. This strengthens the hypothesis of a close 
relationship between cultural dimensions and investment preferences and behavior. 
6.2 Weaknesses of the report and future research 
My results are highly sensitive to the input datasets I have used. For two of the eight products 
in my sample I have used datasets on the structured product and the underlying which are 
consistent. On the remaining six products I have used good datasets on the structured 
products, but unfortunately I have not gotten good datsets on the underlying basket of assets. 
To create proxies on the underlying basket of assets I have used normal distribution. This is a 
strong assumption and one must be careful when interpreting the belonging results. Therefore 
I have based most of my conclusions on the findings from the two products on which I have 
reliable datasets for both the return distribution of the structured product and the underlying 
basket of assets. The fact that my conclusions are mostly based upon the results from two 
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structured products, although highly representative for the Norwegian market, limits the 
generalization potential of the findings in this report. 
However, it is time consuming to make the simulations. Master thesis are dedicated to such 
problems alone. This would clearly have been out of the scope of this thesis which after all is 
about the prospect theory utility approach to structured products. 
Having said that, it would have been highly interesting to have consistent datasets on all the 
products in my sample. Further, it would have been interesting to increase the sample to 
include more structured products. The bigger the sample, the stronger the conclusions of the 
findings. If one eventually could have utility estimations based upon consistent datasets of the 
majority of all structured products offered in Norway, one could conclude with certainty. 
Another interesting topic would be how Norwegian investors like the Swiss structured 
products. In this thesis I have limited the analysis to concern how Swiss investors like 
Norwegian products. Indeed, the scope could be broaden to include many different countries 
to check the consistency between the cultural dimensions and the investment behavior.  
I would like to comment on the assumption that the K-T prospect theory parameters are non-
culturized. This is not necessariliy right. When Kahneman and Tversky conducted their 
surveys they must have chosen a certain group of people. This means that what I used as the 
standard prospect theory parameters actually are parameters adapted to some specific 
culture(s).  
Finally I would like to come with a last proposal for future master thesis: To what extent do 
manufacturers of structured products include cultural dimensions when they deside upon the 
design and the risk profile of the products? My findings implicate that they should do so in 
order to make successful products. However, are they really doing so?  
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8 Appendices 
A - Calibration of dataset 
The datasets of probability distributions from Bøe are limited to a return range from zero 
percent to 25 percent. All probabilities of returns above 25 percent are merged into one row. 
Due to probability weighting the more extreme outcomes are relatively more important in 
prospect theory than in classical decision theory.  
In the datasets provided by Koekebakker and Zakamouline the range is from minus 20 percent 
to 50 percent. The ranges of the structured products payoffs are from zero percent to 40 
percent and zero percent to 36 percent. 
Although there are differences among products and datasets, I find it reasonable to expand the 
range used in the datasets from Bøe. I choose to set the range of the structured products from 
zero percent to 40 percent.  
I use an exponential function to allocate the merged probabilities of the range above 25 
percent into one-percent intervals from 26 percent to 40 percent, assuming that the probability 
of 40 percent annual return is zero. In other words, the merged or pooled probability of a 
return above 25 percent is scattered through an exponential function converging to zero over 
15 intervals. 
I used the goal-seek function in excel to conduct the calibration. 
As for the return of the underlying baskets of assets, I will once again use the return state 
spaces applied by Koekebakker and Zakamouline. For the underlying, this is in the range of 
minus 20 percent to plus 39 and 50 percent. Based on this I define the space for the products’ 
underlying from minus 20 percent to plus 45 percent, which is the average of the two 
Koekebakker and Zakamouline products.  
I stress that the optimal solution would be to expand the range of the Monte Carlo 
simulations. However, Bøe could not meet this request. A recommendation for future work on 
this subject is to apply a larger return space on the input data.  
The original input data from Bøe is presented in Table 8.1. 
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Table 8.1 – Original input data from Bøe 
In the following I explain the calibration process row by row. 
Row 27 is the source of the problem. As we can see, the probabilities for returns above 25 
percent are merged in this row. 
However, the importance of the mergers varies from product to product. This is expressed in 
row 28. I have calculated the ratio of row 27 to row 26, which expresses the importance of the 
pooled probability to the probability of the last 1 percent interval (25 percent return). We see 
that the ratio varies from two to six.  
Based on the ratios in row 28, row 29 indexes the ratios with respect to the highest ratio. 
Finally row 30 shows how many extra intervals should be calculated, where 15 is the 
maximum, as discussed above. The number is based on the index in the row above.  
The calibrated dataset is presented in Table 8.2. 
112 
 
 
Table 8.2 – Calibrated dataset 
We see that the probabilities actually increase from row 26 to row 27 in some of the cases. 
This is because the exponential factor is below one in order to fulfill the criteria that the sum 
of the added probabilities equals the pooled probabilities from before. This affects the value 
of the structured products, but I will still go for this approximation as a fair way to calibrate 
the dataset.  
 
